Gustavo Flores-Macías, Contemporary State Building: Elite Taxation and Public Safety in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Figures, tables, bibliography, index, 260 pp.; hardcover $99.99, ebook $99.99.

The government of Colombia, led by President Álvaro Uribe, imposed a high tax on the country’s wealthy citizens during his first term in office (2002–10), justified by public safety concerns. At the time, the country was internationally seen as a “failed state,” and violence caused by criminal groups and irregular forces seemed impossible to stop. The tax served to fund the military’s professionalization and expansion. Despite the high cost, the tax was successful, and the wealthy continued to pay it for several years. Other Latin American countries attempted, with varying degrees of success, to address their own security issues through similar taxes. In this book, Gustavo Flores-Macías describes a theory in which “demand and supply factors” (2) explain why economic elites in Latin America pay for public goods, even though they have a history of avoiding investing in the state, especially through taxes. Flores-Macías argues that in a world where Latin America is the most dangerous region, organized crime affects not only the daily lives of poor residents but also the activities of companies and wealthy families. When facing a security threat, the economic elite demands state protection. On the supply side, the government provides policy solutions, some of which involve business groups. The linkages between business and government authorities, such as “consultation forums, collaboration mechanisms, and the inclusion of corporate leaders or their representatives into government positions” (49), determine whether the elite tax can be successfully enacted. These relationships are especially strong in right-wing governments, such as in Colombia, Honduras, and several Mexican subnational states, where elites have shown willingness to pay a higher tax. The book connects well the historical literature on state formation to the current discussion on elite taxes. Its main contribution is that contemporary risks to public safety mimic prior systemic crises, which, according to the state formation literature, offer incentives for elites to invest in public safety. Homicide rates in Latin America are currently driving governments and elites to seek remedies that include higher budgetary revenues. This implied longitudinal comparison suggests that the government can hardly force elites to pay security taxes, as would be expected, for example, under a leftist administration. Business actors are still powerful. So, in this context of “strong society, weak state,” the elite’s willingness to invest in public safety is an essential condition. While this argument is compelling and relies on the vibrant literature of state building, there are parts that could benefit from further clarification. State