理解羞耻

IF 0.8 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-12-10 DOI:10.1017/S0031819121000395
J. Laing
{"title":"理解羞耻","authors":"J. Laing","doi":"10.1017/S0031819121000395","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I argue that we face a challenge in understanding the relationship between the ‘value-oriented’ and ‘other-oriented’ dimensions of shame. On the one hand, an emphasis on shame's value-oriented dimension leads naturally to ‘The Self-Evaluation View’, an account which faces a challenge in explaining shame's other-oriented dimension. This is liable to push us towards ‘The Social Evaluation View’. However The Social Evaluation View faces the opposite challenge of convincingly accommodating shame's ‘value-oriented’ dimension. After rejecting one attempt to chart a middle course between these extremes, I argue that progress can be made if we reject the widespread assumption that the other-oriented dimension of shame is best understood primarily terms of our concern with the way we appear to others. Instead, I outline an account which treats shame as manifesting our desire primarily for interpersonal connection and which elucidates the property of shamefulness in terms of merited avoidance (or rejection).","PeriodicalId":54197,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHY","volume":"97 1","pages":"233 - 255"},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Making Sense of Shame\",\"authors\":\"J. Laing\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/S0031819121000395\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract In this paper, I argue that we face a challenge in understanding the relationship between the ‘value-oriented’ and ‘other-oriented’ dimensions of shame. On the one hand, an emphasis on shame's value-oriented dimension leads naturally to ‘The Self-Evaluation View’, an account which faces a challenge in explaining shame's other-oriented dimension. This is liable to push us towards ‘The Social Evaluation View’. However The Social Evaluation View faces the opposite challenge of convincingly accommodating shame's ‘value-oriented’ dimension. After rejecting one attempt to chart a middle course between these extremes, I argue that progress can be made if we reject the widespread assumption that the other-oriented dimension of shame is best understood primarily terms of our concern with the way we appear to others. Instead, I outline an account which treats shame as manifesting our desire primarily for interpersonal connection and which elucidates the property of shamefulness in terms of merited avoidance (or rejection).\",\"PeriodicalId\":54197,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"volume\":\"97 1\",\"pages\":\"233 - 255\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819121000395\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819121000395","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

在本文中,我认为我们在理解羞耻的“价值导向”和“他者导向”维度之间的关系方面面临着挑战。一方面,强调羞耻的价值导向维度自然导致“自我评价观”,这一观点在解释羞耻的他者导向维度时面临挑战。这很容易把我们推向“社会评价观”。然而,社会评价观面临着相反的挑战,即令人信服地适应羞耻的“价值导向”维度。在拒绝了在这两个极端之间画一条中间路线的尝试之后,我认为,如果我们拒绝这样一种普遍的假设,即羞耻的他人导向维度主要是我们对自己在他人眼中的形象的关注,那么我们就可以取得进展。相反,我概述了一种解释,它将羞耻视为我们主要对人际关系的渴望的表现,并从合理回避(或拒绝)的角度阐明了羞耻的属性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
Making Sense of Shame
Abstract In this paper, I argue that we face a challenge in understanding the relationship between the ‘value-oriented’ and ‘other-oriented’ dimensions of shame. On the one hand, an emphasis on shame's value-oriented dimension leads naturally to ‘The Self-Evaluation View’, an account which faces a challenge in explaining shame's other-oriented dimension. This is liable to push us towards ‘The Social Evaluation View’. However The Social Evaluation View faces the opposite challenge of convincingly accommodating shame's ‘value-oriented’ dimension. After rejecting one attempt to chart a middle course between these extremes, I argue that progress can be made if we reject the widespread assumption that the other-oriented dimension of shame is best understood primarily terms of our concern with the way we appear to others. Instead, I outline an account which treats shame as manifesting our desire primarily for interpersonal connection and which elucidates the property of shamefulness in terms of merited avoidance (or rejection).
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: Philosophy is the journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, which was founded in 1925 to build bridges between specialist philosophers and a wider educated public. The journal continues to fulfil a dual role: it is one of the leading academic journals of philosophy, but it also serves the philosophical interests of specialists in other fields (law, language, literature and the arts, medicine, politics, religion, science, education, psychology, history) and those of the informed general reader. Contributors are required to avoid needless technicality of language and presentation. The institutional subscription includes two supplements.
期刊最新文献
Dark Futures: Toward a Philosophical Archaeology of Hope Mobility, Migration, and Mobile Migration Feeling Responsible: On Regret for Others’ Harms Being Open-Minded about Open-Mindedness P.F. Strawson on Punishment and the Hypothesis of Symbolic Retribution
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1