法院的锡耳:克图纳族与协商义务的基础

IF 0.3 Q3 LAW ALBERTA LAW REVIEW Pub Date : 2019-03-25 DOI:10.29173/ALR2520
R. Hamilton, J. Nichols
{"title":"法院的锡耳:克图纳族与协商义务的基础","authors":"R. Hamilton, J. Nichols","doi":"10.29173/ALR2520","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The recent Ktunaxa Nation decision of the Supreme Court of Canada provides an opportunity to discuss the fundamental legal presumptions that underlie the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples. The jurisprudence in this area has been based on a “thick” conception of Crown sovereignty as including legislative power and underlying title in relation to Aboriginal lands. This, in the Supreme Court’s view, justifies the possibility of the unilateral infringement of Aboriginal rights. This framework assumes that the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is a sovereign-to-subjects one. This assumption, however, lacks a legal and factual basis. \nConversely, Aboriginal peoples articulate their claims in the language of inherent jurisdiction within a nation-to nation relationship. If the Supreme Court acknowledged that the relationship between the parties is indeed nation-to-nation, the appropriate doctrine would no longer be a duty to consult and accommodate. Following the approach to a similar relationship outlined by the Supreme Court in the Secession Reference, the appropriate model would be a generative duty to negotiate. This article sets a path to a model that preserves the useful components of the duty to consult while providing a remedy to the distributional inequity in bargaining power created under the current framework, thereby opening avenues for effective conflict resolution.","PeriodicalId":54047,"journal":{"name":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2019-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"17","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa Nation and the Foundation of the Duty to Consult\",\"authors\":\"R. Hamilton, J. Nichols\",\"doi\":\"10.29173/ALR2520\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The recent Ktunaxa Nation decision of the Supreme Court of Canada provides an opportunity to discuss the fundamental legal presumptions that underlie the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples. The jurisprudence in this area has been based on a “thick” conception of Crown sovereignty as including legislative power and underlying title in relation to Aboriginal lands. This, in the Supreme Court’s view, justifies the possibility of the unilateral infringement of Aboriginal rights. This framework assumes that the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is a sovereign-to-subjects one. This assumption, however, lacks a legal and factual basis. \\nConversely, Aboriginal peoples articulate their claims in the language of inherent jurisdiction within a nation-to nation relationship. If the Supreme Court acknowledged that the relationship between the parties is indeed nation-to-nation, the appropriate doctrine would no longer be a duty to consult and accommodate. Following the approach to a similar relationship outlined by the Supreme Court in the Secession Reference, the appropriate model would be a generative duty to negotiate. This article sets a path to a model that preserves the useful components of the duty to consult while providing a remedy to the distributional inequity in bargaining power created under the current framework, thereby opening avenues for effective conflict resolution.\",\"PeriodicalId\":54047,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-03-25\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"17\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2520\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ALBERTA LAW REVIEW","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.29173/ALR2520","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 17

摘要

加拿大最高法院最近对克图纳克萨民族的裁决提供了一个机会,可以讨论作为王室咨询和照顾原住民义务基础的基本法律推定。这一领域的判例基于“厚”的王室主权概念,包括与原住民土地有关的立法权和基本所有权。最高法院认为,这证明了单方面侵犯土著权利的可能性是合理的。该框架假定王室和原住民之间的关系是主权对主体的关系。然而,这一假设缺乏法律和事实依据。相反,原住民在国家间关系中用固有管辖权的语言表达他们的主张。如果最高法院承认各方之间的关系确实是国家与国家之间的关系,那么适当的原则将不再是协商和适应的义务。按照最高法院在《分裂国家参考》中概述的类似关系的方法,适当的模式将是谈判的生成义务。这篇文章为一种模式开辟了一条道路,该模式保留了协商义务的有用组成部分,同时为当前框架下造成的议价能力分配不平等提供了补救措施,从而为有效解决冲突开辟了途径。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
The Tin Ear of the Court: Ktunaxa Nation and the Foundation of the Duty to Consult
The recent Ktunaxa Nation decision of the Supreme Court of Canada provides an opportunity to discuss the fundamental legal presumptions that underlie the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Aboriginal peoples. The jurisprudence in this area has been based on a “thick” conception of Crown sovereignty as including legislative power and underlying title in relation to Aboriginal lands. This, in the Supreme Court’s view, justifies the possibility of the unilateral infringement of Aboriginal rights. This framework assumes that the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples is a sovereign-to-subjects one. This assumption, however, lacks a legal and factual basis. Conversely, Aboriginal peoples articulate their claims in the language of inherent jurisdiction within a nation-to nation relationship. If the Supreme Court acknowledged that the relationship between the parties is indeed nation-to-nation, the appropriate doctrine would no longer be a duty to consult and accommodate. Following the approach to a similar relationship outlined by the Supreme Court in the Secession Reference, the appropriate model would be a generative duty to negotiate. This article sets a path to a model that preserves the useful components of the duty to consult while providing a remedy to the distributional inequity in bargaining power created under the current framework, thereby opening avenues for effective conflict resolution.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
20.00%
发文量
2
期刊最新文献
Canadian Challenges in Implementing the Kyoto Protocol: A Cause for Harmonization Principles of Kyoto and Emissions Trading Systems: A Primer for Energy Lawyers Fundamental Aspects of Oil and Gas Revisited Coalbed Methane: Conventional Rules for an Unconventional Resource Recent Regulatory and Legislative Developments of Interest to Oil and Gas Lawyers
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1