尊严与社会意义:作为宪法对话的奥伯格费尔、温莎和劳伦斯

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q2 LAW Fordham Law Review Pub Date : 2018-06-18 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.3153661
S. Sanders
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引用次数: 1

摘要

最高法院的三项最重要的男女同性恋权利裁决——奥伯格费尔诉霍奇斯案、美国诉温莎案和劳伦斯诉德克萨斯州案——基于男女同性恋有权享有尊严的原则。除了有形的后果外,各州禁止同性婚姻、联邦《婚姻保护法》和鸡奸法的共同宪法弊端是,它们对政要施加了伤害。本文探讨了男女同性恋尊严案件如何体现宪法从最高法院积极参与的社会和文化对话中产生的过程。在这方面,它借鉴了关于对话司法审查和社会意义在宪法中的作用的学术文献。它阐明了最高法院如何解释民主偏好和构建社会意义,以便将基本宪法规范应用于新出现的法律主张。与一些评论家的猜测相反,在这些案件中,“尊严”并不是一种新的宪法权利。相反,识别和保护权贵利益是一个过程的统一原则,在十三年的时间里,这一过程在三个案例中展开,通过这一过程,宪法与不断变化的公众态度和政策偏好相一致。尊严裁决应该被理解为多数主义,而不是司法意愿的行为。他们被广泛接受,因为最高法院对同性恋者在美国社会中地位的见解与文化和公众态度的戏剧性和长期变化相一致。随着文化和态度的演变,反同性恋法律的社会意义也在演变。鸡奸法和婚姻限制曾经被认为是宪法对传统和公共道德的保护,但现在越来越被理解为污名和羞辱的强加——宪法禁止这种明显的伤害。
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Dignity and Social Meaning: Obergefell, Windsor, and Lawrence as Constitutional Dialogue
The Supreme Court’s three most important gay and lesbian rights decisions – Obergefell v. Hodges, United States v. Windsor, and Lawrence v. Texas – are united by the principle that gays and lesbians are entitled to dignity. Beyond their tangible consequences, the common constitutional evil of state bans on same-sex marriage, the federal Defense of Marriage Act, and sodomy laws was that they imposed dignitary harm. This Article explores how the gay and lesbian dignity cases exemplify the process by which constitutional law emerges from a social and cultural dialogue in which the Supreme Court actively participates. In doing so, it draws on the scholarly literatures on dialogic judicial review and the role of social meaning in constitutional law. It illuminates how the Supreme Court interprets democratic preferences and constructs social meaning in order to apply fundamental Constitutional norms to emerging legal claims. Contrary to the speculations of some commentators, “dignity” in these cases did not operate as some new form of constitutional right. Rather, the identification and protection of dignitary interests served as the unifying principle for a process, unfolding in three cases over thirteen years, through which constitutional law was brought into alignment with evolving public attitudes and policy preferences. The dignity decisions should be understood as majoritarian, not acts of judicial will. They were broadly accepted, because the Court’s insights about the status of gays and lesbians in American society were consistent with dramatic and long-term changes in culture and public attitudes. As culture and attitudes evolved, so did the social meaning of anti-gay laws. Sodomy laws and marriage restrictions, once accepted as presumptively constitutional protections of tradition and public morality, increasingly came be understood as impositions of stigma and humiliation -- the kind of expressive harms that the Constitution forbids.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
12.50%
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0
期刊介绍: The Fordham Law Review is a scholarly journal serving the legal profession and the public by discussing current legal issues. Approximately 75 articles, written by students or submitted by outside authors, are published each year. Each volume comprises six books, three each semester, totaling over 3,000 pages. Managed by a board of up to eighteen student editors, the Law Review is a working journal, not merely an honor society. Nevertheless, Law Review membership is considered among the highest scholarly achievements at the Law School.
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