罗尔斯正义论中的原则与判断

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY Pub Date : 2021-07-22 DOI:10.5840/ipq2021617176
T. Furlan
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中,我认为,罗尔斯通过无知的面纱将平等尊重和考虑的权利融入到最初的立场中,不能独立于对经过深思熟虑的判决的上诉之外,为他的两项正义原则提供支持。问题是,这项权利的模糊程度令人无法容忍。关键术语的含义既不透明,也不明确,因此只能在经过深思熟虑的判断的背景下才能理解。在该原则保持模糊的范围内,它对原始立场的条件没有任何限制。就其含义而言,其解释以原则和经过深思熟虑的判断为前提,这些原则和判断本应通过原始立场的手段独立证明。最后,我回应了诺姆·丹尼尔斯的说法,即“广泛的反思平衡”提供了一种独立于道德原则各自深思熟虑的判断来测试道德原则的方法。
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Principles and Judgments in Rawls’s Theory of Justice
In this paper I argue that the right to equal respect and consideration that Rawls incorporates into the original position by means of the veil of ignorance cannot provide support for his two principles of justice independently of an appeal to considered judgments. The trouble is that this right is intolerably vague. The crucial terms are neither transparent in meaning nor clearly definable, and so they can only be understood against a background of considered judgments. To the extent that the principle is kept vague, it places no constraints on the conditions of the original position. To the extent that its meaning is specified, its interpretation presupposes the very principles and considered judgments that are supposed to be independently justified by the device of the original position. Finally, I respond to Norm Daniels’s claim that “wide reflective equilibrium” provides a way to test moral principles independently of their respective considered judgments.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
14
期刊介绍: International Philosophical Quarterly has provided a peer-reviewed forum in English for the international exchange of basic philosophical ideas since 1961. The journal stands in the general tradition of theistic and personalist humanism without further restriction of school or philosophical orientation, and is open to both the philosophical discussion of contemporary issues and historical studies. It is truly international in scope with contributions from authors around the world and circulation to institutions and individuals in 70 countries. IPQ numbers among its Associate Editors scholars from both the Far East and Europe, and the journal enjoys a long-standing relationship with the Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix in Belgium.
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