功能障碍与疾病理论的数量问题

IF 0.7 Q4 ETHICS European Journal of Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-12-01 DOI:10.31820/ejap.17.3.6
T. Schramme
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引用次数: 1

摘要

许多生物学功能允许分级。例如,与另一场合的同一生物体相比或与其他生物体相比,生物体中特定激素的分泌可以处于更高或更低的水平。什么样的功能水平构成功能障碍;我们应该在哪里划线?这是功能障碍和疾病理论的数量问题。我的目标是为解决这个问题的功能障碍生物学理论辩护。然而,我也将允许将评估性考虑纳入疾病理论。我的论点是基于生物学和临床观点之间的区别。根据我的推理,疾病仅限于生物功能障碍范围内的情况。应对数量问题不需要武断的决定或社会价值判断。因此,我主张采用一种非任意的、基于事实的方法来解决数量问题。尽管如此,并不是所有的生物功能障碍都是疾病的例子。增加临床视角可以防止生物学视角的潜在过度包容性,因为它进一步限制了疾病的边界。
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The Quantitative Problem for Theories of Dysfunction and Disease
Many biological functions allow for grades. For example, secretion of a specific hormone in an organism can be on a higher or lower level, compared to the same organism at another occasion or compared to other organisms. What levels of functioning constitute instances of dysfunction; where should we draw the line? This is the quantitative problem for theories of dysfunction and disease. I aim to defend a version of biological theories of dysfunction to tackle this problem. However, I will also allow evaluative considerations to enter into a theory of disease. My argument is based on a distinction between a biological and a clinical perspective. Disease, according to my reasoning, is restricted to instances that fall within the boundaries of biological dysfunctions. Responding to the quantitative problem does not require arbitrary decisions or social value-judgements. Hence, I argue for a non-arbitrary, fact-based method to address the quantitative problem. Still, not all biological dysfunctions are instances of disease. Adding a clinical perspective allows us to prevent the potential over-inclusiveness of the biological perspective, because it restricts the boundaries of disease even further.
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来源期刊
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
4
审稿时长
22 weeks
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