立法专业优势的来源:吸引更多知识型候选人

IF 1.7 2区 社会学 Q2 POLITICAL SCIENCE State Politics & Policy Quarterly Pub Date : 2020-06-26 DOI:10.1177/1532440020930709
Zoe Nemerever, Daniel M. Butler
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引用次数: 0

摘要

了解选民意见的立法者更有可能成功地在当今问题上提供实质性代表。然而,先前的研究表明,州立法者和候选人通常会错误估计选民的偏好。一些研究还发现,在高度专业化的立法机构中,候选人和现任议员不太可能错误估计选民的意见。我们调查为什么存在这种专业优势。我们使用Blinder–Oaxaca分解来确定职业优势在多大程度上可以归因于三个来源:吸引知识渊博的候选人、培养在职立法者的知识和留住在职者。我们将分解应用于2014年全国候选人调查中候选人对民意的看法数据。在职期间培养知识和留住在职人员并不是专业优势的原因。我们发现,有证据表明,专业性优势的产生是因为更高的专业性立法机构吸引了更多知识渊博的非障碍候选人。
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The Source of the Legislative Professionalism Advantage: Attracting More Knowledgeable Candidates
Legislators who know their constituents’ opinions are more likely to be successful in providing substantive representation on issues of the day. However, previous work suggests that state legislators and candidates commonly misestimate their constituents’ preferences. Some of that work also finds that candidates and current incumbents in highly professionalized legislatures are less likely to misestimate constituent opinion. We investigate why this professionalism advantage exists. We use a Blinder–Oaxaca decomposition to determine how much of the professionalism advantage can be attributed to three sources: attracting knowledgeable candidates, fostering legislator knowledge in office, and retaining incumbents. We apply the decomposition to data on candidates’ perceptions of public opinion from the 2014 National Candidate Survey. Fostering knowledge in office and retaining incumbents are not responsible for the professionalism advantage. We find evidence that the professionalism advantage occurs because higher professionalism legislatures attract more knowledgeable nonincumbent candidates.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.00
自引率
6.70%
发文量
24
期刊介绍: State Politics & Policy Quarterly (SPPQ) features studies that develop general hypotheses of political behavior and policymaking and test these hypotheses using the unique methodological advantages of the states. It also includes field review essays and a section entitled “The Practical Researcher,” which is a service-oriented feature designed to provide a data, methodological, and assessment resource for those conducting research on state politics. SPPQ is the official journal of the State Politics and Policy section of the American Political Science Association and is published by the University of Illinois Press for the Institute of Legislative Studies at the University of Illinois at Springfield.
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