{"title":"识别导致敌对僵尸网络差异极化效应的行为因素","authors":"Yeonjung Lee, M. Ozer, S. Corman, H. Davulcu","doi":"10.1145/3610409.3610412","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we utilize a Twitter dataset collected between December 8, 2021 and February 18, 2022, during the lead-up to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Our aim is to design a data processing pipeline featuring a high-accuracy Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) based political camp classifier, a botnet detection algorithm, and a robust measure of botnet effects. Our experiments reveal that while the pro-Russian botnet contributes significantly to network polarization, the pro-Ukrainian botnet contributes with moderating effects. To understand the factors leading to these different effects, we analyze the interactions between the botnets and the users, distinguishing between barrier-crossing users, who navigate across different political camps, and barrier-bound users, who remain within their own camps. We observe that the pro-Russian botnet amplifies the barrier-bound partisan users within their own camp most of the time. In contrast, the pro-Ukrainian botnet amplifies the barrier-crossing users on their own camp alongside themselves for the majority of the time.","PeriodicalId":42971,"journal":{"name":"Applied Computing Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Identifying Behavioral Factors Leading to Differential Polarization Effects of Adversarial Botnets\",\"authors\":\"Yeonjung Lee, M. Ozer, S. Corman, H. Davulcu\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/3610409.3610412\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper, we utilize a Twitter dataset collected between December 8, 2021 and February 18, 2022, during the lead-up to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Our aim is to design a data processing pipeline featuring a high-accuracy Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) based political camp classifier, a botnet detection algorithm, and a robust measure of botnet effects. Our experiments reveal that while the pro-Russian botnet contributes significantly to network polarization, the pro-Ukrainian botnet contributes with moderating effects. To understand the factors leading to these different effects, we analyze the interactions between the botnets and the users, distinguishing between barrier-crossing users, who navigate across different political camps, and barrier-bound users, who remain within their own camps. We observe that the pro-Russian botnet amplifies the barrier-bound partisan users within their own camp most of the time. In contrast, the pro-Ukrainian botnet amplifies the barrier-crossing users on their own camp alongside themselves for the majority of the time.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42971,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Applied Computing Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Applied Computing Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/3610409.3610412\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Applied Computing Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3610409.3610412","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Identifying Behavioral Factors Leading to Differential Polarization Effects of Adversarial Botnets
In this paper, we utilize a Twitter dataset collected between December 8, 2021 and February 18, 2022, during the lead-up to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Our aim is to design a data processing pipeline featuring a high-accuracy Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) based political camp classifier, a botnet detection algorithm, and a robust measure of botnet effects. Our experiments reveal that while the pro-Russian botnet contributes significantly to network polarization, the pro-Ukrainian botnet contributes with moderating effects. To understand the factors leading to these different effects, we analyze the interactions between the botnets and the users, distinguishing between barrier-crossing users, who navigate across different political camps, and barrier-bound users, who remain within their own camps. We observe that the pro-Russian botnet amplifies the barrier-bound partisan users within their own camp most of the time. In contrast, the pro-Ukrainian botnet amplifies the barrier-crossing users on their own camp alongside themselves for the majority of the time.