谁是阴谋论理论家?

IF 1.4 2区 哲学 Q1 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Social Epistemology Pub Date : 2023-02-20 DOI:10.1080/02691728.2023.2172695
M. Tsapos
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引用次数: 7

摘要

“阴谋论”一词最简单、最自然的定义让我们得出结论,我们都是阴谋论者。然而,我声称,我们大多数人不会自我认同。在本文中,我称之为自我认同问题。由于几乎每个人都是阴谋论者,这个术语在理论上基本上是徒劳的。这就像是用一种让每个人都聪明的方式来定义智力。这就提出了理论成果的问题,即如何以理论成果的方式定义概念的问题。我认为,这些问题目前在文献中引起了混乱,并给我们带来了一个困境,即阴谋定义困境。我将对文献进行分析,并对我的重建提供的解决方案进行分析,认为没有一个是令人满意的。要么a)该解决方案将解决自我认同的问题,要么b)它将潜在地提供一个理论上富有成果的定义,但没有一个账户同时做到这两个。视频摘要
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Who is a Conspiracy Theorist?
ABSTRACT The simplest and most natural definition of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ leads us to the conclusion that we are all conspiracy theorists. Yet, I claim that most of us would not self-identify as such. In this paper I call this the problem of self-identification. Since virtually everyone emerges as a conspiracy theorist, the term is essentially theoretically fruitless. It would be like defining intelligence in a way that makes everyone intelligent. This raises the problem for theoretical fruitfulness, i.e. the problem of how to define the concept in a theoretically fruitful way. I suggest that these problems are currently causing confusion in the literature and present us with a dilemma, the conspiracy definition dilemma. I will present an analysis of the literature and what are on my reconstruction the solutions on offer, and argue that none is satisfactory. Either a) the solution will solve the problem of self-identification or b) it will potentially provide a theoretical fruitful definition, but no account does both. Video abstract
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
17.60%
发文量
60
期刊介绍: Social Epistemology provides a forum for philosophical and social scientific enquiry that incorporates the work of scholars from a variety of disciplines who share a concern with the production, assessment and validation of knowledge. The journal covers both empirical research into the origination and transmission of knowledge and normative considerations which arise as such research is implemented, serving as a guide for directing contemporary knowledge enterprises. Social Epistemology publishes "exchanges" which are the collective product of several contributors and take the form of critical syntheses, open peer commentaries interviews, applications, provocations, reviews and responses
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