良心豁免的一般权利:超越宗教特权。作者:John Adenitire。【剑桥大学出版社,2020。xiv+320页。精装版85.00英镑。ISBN 978-1-10-847845-8。]

IF 1.5 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Cambridge Law Journal Pub Date : 2022-07-01 DOI:10.1017/S0008197322000393
Guy Baldwin
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引用次数: 0

摘要

比弗在第二部分中出色地阐述了这一点,使我们摆脱了第三部分中讨论的大法理学斗争中的旧争论。这一点尤其重要,因为在整个第三部分中——占全书内容的一半以上——比弗试图在对抗另一个阵营的战斗中捍卫一个阵营,尽管他承认这场战斗是在浪费时间。借用比弗的弗洛伊德术语(第264页),他似乎是在有意识地试图从战斗中继续前进,而自己却无意识地加入了战斗。比弗对法律实证主义的持续攻击往往是有力而巧妙的。然而,在展开这些攻击时,他只少量地引用了塞尔的观点,并采用了一种与传统的法学实践几乎没有区别的方法论,充分利用了教义性的法律材料(展示了比弗在侵权法方面的专业知识),但最终让哲学家自己的直觉完成了决定性的工作。因此,比弗用他自己的实践证明,人们仍然可以对持续的法理学辩论做出新的贡献,塞尔的社会哲学没有使我们能够解决或化解这些辩论。
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A General Right to Conscientious Exemption: Beyond Religious Privilege. By John Adenitire. [Cambridge University Press, 2020. xiv + 320 pp. Hardback £85.00. ISBN 978-1-10-847845-8.]
excellently presented by Beever in Part II, can free us from the old debates in the grand jurisprudential battle discussed in Part III. This is so particularly because throughout Part III – consisting more than half of the book’s content – Beever is trying to defend one camp in the battle against the other, despite his avowal that this battle is a great waste of time. To borrow Beever’s Freudian terminology (p. 264), it almost seems that he is consciously trying to move on from the battle while unconsciously joining the battle himself. Beever’s sustained attacks on legal positivism are often vigorous and skilful. However, in deploying those attacks he draws only sparingly on Searle and adopts a methodology that is virtually indistinguishable from how jurisprudence has traditionally been practised, making good use of doctrinal legal materials (showcasing Beever’s expertise in tort law), but ultimately letting the philosopher’s own intuition do the decisive work. Beever hence demonstrates by his own practice that one can still make new contributions to the persistent jurisprudential debates, which Searle’s social philosophy has not enabled us to either resolve or dissolve.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
6.70%
发文量
56
期刊介绍: The Cambridge Law Journal publishes articles on all aspects of law. Special emphasis is placed on contemporary developments, but the journal''s range includes jurisprudence and legal history. An important feature of the journal is the Case and Comment section, in which members of the Cambridge Law Faculty and other distinguished contributors analyse recent judicial decisions, new legislation and current law reform proposals. The articles and case notes are designed to have the widest appeal to those interested in the law - whether as practitioners, students, teachers, judges or administrators - and to provide an opportunity for them to keep abreast of new ideas and the progress of legal reform. Each issue also contains an extensive section of book reviews.
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RECYCLED MALICE RELATIONAL TRADE NETWORKS SECTION 36 OF THE LIMITATION ACT 1980 THE UK INTERNAL MARKET: A GLOBAL OUTLIER? WEDNESBURY UNREASONABLENESS
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