{"title":"从价税与从价税在竞争市场中的不等价与偷税漏税","authors":"Che-chiang Huang, K. L. G. Ueng, Jin-Li Hu","doi":"10.15057/28613","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The well-known equivalence between specific and ad valorem taxation in competitive markets may not hold in the presence of tax evasion. Evading specific taxes has to take place via concealing quantities sold, whereas evading ad valorem taxes can take place via concealing selling prices as well as quantities sold. We show that in the competitive market (i) this difference could make the equivalence of these two taxes break down, and (ii) specific taxation may be superior to ad valorem taxation if it causes firms to channel fewer resources into tax evasion, given other things being equal.","PeriodicalId":43705,"journal":{"name":"Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics","volume":"58 1","pages":"41-51"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"NON-EQUIVALENCE OF SPECIFIC AND AD VALOREM TAXATION IN THE COMPETITIVE MARKET WITH TAX EVASION\",\"authors\":\"Che-chiang Huang, K. L. G. Ueng, Jin-Li Hu\",\"doi\":\"10.15057/28613\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The well-known equivalence between specific and ad valorem taxation in competitive markets may not hold in the presence of tax evasion. Evading specific taxes has to take place via concealing quantities sold, whereas evading ad valorem taxes can take place via concealing selling prices as well as quantities sold. We show that in the competitive market (i) this difference could make the equivalence of these two taxes break down, and (ii) specific taxation may be superior to ad valorem taxation if it causes firms to channel fewer resources into tax evasion, given other things being equal.\",\"PeriodicalId\":43705,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics\",\"volume\":\"58 1\",\"pages\":\"41-51\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15057/28613\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15057/28613","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
NON-EQUIVALENCE OF SPECIFIC AND AD VALOREM TAXATION IN THE COMPETITIVE MARKET WITH TAX EVASION
The well-known equivalence between specific and ad valorem taxation in competitive markets may not hold in the presence of tax evasion. Evading specific taxes has to take place via concealing quantities sold, whereas evading ad valorem taxes can take place via concealing selling prices as well as quantities sold. We show that in the competitive market (i) this difference could make the equivalence of these two taxes break down, and (ii) specific taxation may be superior to ad valorem taxation if it causes firms to channel fewer resources into tax evasion, given other things being equal.