公平配对肾脏捐献的组合Hodge理论

IF 1.7 Q2 MATHEMATICS, APPLIED Foundations of data science (Springfield, Mo.) Pub Date : 2019-03-07 DOI:10.3934/FODS.2019004
Joshua L. Mike, V. Maroulas
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引用次数: 4

摘要

肾脏配对捐献(KPD)是一种将不相容的患者-供体配对(PD对)输入池中以寻找相容的循环肾脏交换的系统,其中每对配对提供和接受一个肾脏。传统上,人们是从经济理论和整数规划框架来看待捐赠池分配决策问题的。虽然以前的分配模式可以很好地在特定时间捐献最大数量的肾脏,但在这样的交换中,某些亚组患者很少匹配。因此,这些方法导致了器官交换系统的不公平,许多患者反复拒绝换肾。我们的目标是调查患者之间肾脏分配分配的不公平,并提出一种最小化分配差异的算法。该方法受上同调的启发,有效地描述了肾脏交换中的循环结构;然后使用这个结构来寻找一个公平的肾脏分配。我们的方法的另一个关键结果是在PD对上定义的分数函数,它测量KPD池内的周期差异;也就是说,如果周期选择一致,该函数测量每个PD对参与肾脏交换的相对机会。具体来说,我们发现供体需求不足或高度敏感的PD配对比典型的PD配对得分低。此外,我们的研究结果表明,当使用效用最优整数规划方法进行分配时,PD对评分和获得肾脏的机会呈正相关。相比之下,通过我们的方法获得肾脏的机会与得分无关,因此在这方面是公正的。
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Combinatorial Hodge theory for equitable kidney paired donation
Kidney Paired Donation (KPD) is a system whereby incompatible patient-donor pairs (PD pairs) are entered into a pool to find compatible cyclic kidney exchanges where each pair gives and receives a kidney. The donation allocation decision problem for a KPD pool has traditionally been viewed within an economic theory and integer-programming framework. While previous allocation schema work well to donate the maximum number of kidneys at a specific time, certain subgroups of patients are rarely matched in such an exchange. Consequently, these methods lead to systematic inequity in the exchange, where many patients are rejected a kidney repeatedly. Our goal is to investigate inequity within the distribution of kidney allocation among patients, and to present an algorithm which minimizes allocation disparities. The method presented is inspired by cohomology and describes the cyclic structure in a kidney exchange efficiently; this structure is then used to search for an equitable kidney allocation. Another key result of our approach is a score function defined on PD pairs which measures cycle disparity within a KPD pool; i.e., this function measures the relative chance for each PD pair to take part in the kidney exchange if cycles are chosen uniformly. Specifically, we show that PD pairs with underdemanded donors or highly sensitized patients have lower scores than typical PD pairs. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that PD pair score and the chance to obtain a kidney are positively correlated when allocation is done by utility-optimal integer programming methods. In contrast, the chance to obtain a kidney through our method is independent of score, and thus unbiased in this regard.
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