{"title":"关税、贸易和不完全的CAP改革","authors":"Alan Swinbank","doi":"10.7896/j.1809","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The original CAP’s high levels of border protection on many products involved a variable import levy bridging the gap between world prices and the EU’s much higher minimum import price. The Uruguay Round ended this, but tariffication also meant that subsequent CAP reforms reducing EU levels of domestic market price support would no longer trigger lower tariffs. Moreover the Doha Round’s plans for tariff cuts are in abeyance. The consequences are: i) for these products, only preferential sup¬pliers penetrate the EU’s protected market; ii) negotiation of Free Trade Areas is made more complicated; and iii) “Brexit” is problematic.","PeriodicalId":44547,"journal":{"name":"Studies in Agricultural Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2018-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Tariffs, trade, and incomplete CAP reform\",\"authors\":\"Alan Swinbank\",\"doi\":\"10.7896/j.1809\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The original CAP’s high levels of border protection on many products involved a variable import levy bridging the gap between world prices and the EU’s much higher minimum import price. The Uruguay Round ended this, but tariffication also meant that subsequent CAP reforms reducing EU levels of domestic market price support would no longer trigger lower tariffs. Moreover the Doha Round’s plans for tariff cuts are in abeyance. The consequences are: i) for these products, only preferential sup¬pliers penetrate the EU’s protected market; ii) negotiation of Free Trade Areas is made more complicated; and iii) “Brexit” is problematic.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44547,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Studies in Agricultural Economics\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-08-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Studies in Agricultural Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.7896/j.1809\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studies in Agricultural Economics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7896/j.1809","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS & POLICY","Score":null,"Total":0}
The original CAP’s high levels of border protection on many products involved a variable import levy bridging the gap between world prices and the EU’s much higher minimum import price. The Uruguay Round ended this, but tariffication also meant that subsequent CAP reforms reducing EU levels of domestic market price support would no longer trigger lower tariffs. Moreover the Doha Round’s plans for tariff cuts are in abeyance. The consequences are: i) for these products, only preferential sup¬pliers penetrate the EU’s protected market; ii) negotiation of Free Trade Areas is made more complicated; and iii) “Brexit” is problematic.