{"title":"实际行动能证明现实主义原则的合理性吗?作为现实主义家庭成员的规范行为主义","authors":"J. Floyd","doi":"10.1080/13698230.2022.2120656","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT If Alison McQueen is right that there is a broad ‘family’ of realist approaches to political theory, then it follows there are several ways of ‘doing’ realism, as illustrated by this collection. Here, I set out one such way, normative behaviourism, by explaining its realist character on four fronts: Its starting point; its values; its ambitions; and its treatment of a shared problem. The argument then considers two key objections to the described approach, both of which affect a range of possible realisms.","PeriodicalId":46451,"journal":{"name":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","volume":"26 1","pages":"356 - 375"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-09-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Can real actions justify realist principles? Normative behaviourism as a member of the realist family\",\"authors\":\"J. Floyd\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/13698230.2022.2120656\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT If Alison McQueen is right that there is a broad ‘family’ of realist approaches to political theory, then it follows there are several ways of ‘doing’ realism, as illustrated by this collection. Here, I set out one such way, normative behaviourism, by explaining its realist character on four fronts: Its starting point; its values; its ambitions; and its treatment of a shared problem. The argument then considers two key objections to the described approach, both of which affect a range of possible realisms.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46451,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"26 1\",\"pages\":\"356 - 375\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-09-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2022.2120656\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2022.2120656","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Can real actions justify realist principles? Normative behaviourism as a member of the realist family
ABSTRACT If Alison McQueen is right that there is a broad ‘family’ of realist approaches to political theory, then it follows there are several ways of ‘doing’ realism, as illustrated by this collection. Here, I set out one such way, normative behaviourism, by explaining its realist character on four fronts: Its starting point; its values; its ambitions; and its treatment of a shared problem. The argument then considers two key objections to the described approach, both of which affect a range of possible realisms.