社论:历史的世界有多少?

IF 0.4 3区 历史学 Q1 HISTORY Journal of the Philosophy of History Pub Date : 2021-07-09 DOI:10.1163/18722636-12341459
Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen
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Their application of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI), borrowed from physics, strikingly states that all possible histories exist. It may be the case that we, in fact, inhabit a less probable world. The authors also suggest that MWI can help us to think about causation in history. Georg Gangl likewise studies the nature of causality in his research paper. Gangl argues that historiography shares the same form of explanation, causal narrative explanation, as other historical sciences, such as evolutionary biology and paleontology. According to Gangl, “historians track with their narratives ... ‘causal networks’ that spread through time,” which seems to take us beyond the historian-narrator’s world to the real mechanisms of the past. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

自20世纪70年代以来,对历史写作叙事方面的关注加强了关于史学的建构主义和多元主义假设。文本中的叙事和叙事特征通常被理解为依赖于主体方面,因此依赖于叙述者及其文化。假设叙事性是历史呈现的基本特征,那么似乎可以得出的结论是,对过去的客观正确的叙述不可能只有一种。相反,历史有许多可能的(文学)世界。但是,关于历史世界,还有其他理由支持多元主义吗?相比之下,人们通常认为科学逐渐揭示了自然的秘密,揭穿了我们的错误和神话。这种形式的进步当然受到了库恩和其他历史哲学家的质疑,但仍然吸引了许多人的想象力。是否可以用类似的方式来看待过去?也就是说,我们是否可以认为艰苦的研究揭示了真实的过去的形状,这也许也可以作为未来的指南?此外,如果我们认为历史解释是因果关系,引用现象的因果关系,这是否增加了史学中的现实主义的力量?在过去是否存在一种正确且可描述的因果结构?我们能找到关于过去的唯一真实的叙述吗?这个问题的论文是由他们对历史知识的形式和哲学意义的关注而统一起来的。具体来说,他们讨论了叙事性、因果关系和历史(再)呈现的多元性。Bruce S. Bennett和Moletlanyi Tshipa最明确地主张历史世界的多元性。他们从物理学中借鉴的多世界解释(MWI)的应用惊人地表明,所有可能的历史都存在。事实上,我们可能生活在一个不太可能发生的世界。作者还认为,MWI可以帮助我们思考历史上的因果关系。Georg Gangl同样在他的研究论文中研究了因果关系的本质。Gangl认为,史学与其他历史科学(如进化生物学和古生物学)有着相同的解释形式,即因果叙事解释。根据Gangl的说法,“历史学家追踪他们的叙述……通过时间传播的‘因果网络’,”这似乎把我们带出了历史叙述者的世界,到了过去的真实机制。然而,
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Editorial: How Many Worlds of History Are There?
The focus on the narrative aspects of the writing of history since the 1970s has reinforced constructivist and pluralist assumptions about historiography. Narrativization and narrative features in texts have typically been understood as being dependent on the subject-side, and thus, on the narrator and her culture. Assuming then that narrativity is an essential feature of historical presentation, the conclusion that seems to follow is that there cannot be only one objectively correct narrativization of the past. Instead, there are many possible (literary) worlds of history. But are there other reasons to favor pluralism with respect to the worlds of history? By contrast, it is often thought that the sciences gradually reveal the secrets of nature and debunk our errors and myths. This form of progress has of course been questioned by Kuhn and other historical philosophers in particular but still captures the imagination of many. Could the past be approached in a similar way? That is, could we think that painstaking study reveals the shape of the real past, which could perhaps also function as a guide to the future? Further, if we think that historical explanations are causal, citing causes and effects of phenomena, does this add force to realism in historiography? Is it conceivable that there is something like one correct and describable causal structure in the past? And can we get to the one true account of the past? The papers of this issue are united by their concern with the form and philosophical bearing of historical knowledge. Specifically, they discuss narrativity, causality and plurality of historical (re)presentations. Bruce S. Bennett and Moletlanyi Tshipa argue most explicitly for the plurality of historical worlds. Their application of the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI), borrowed from physics, strikingly states that all possible histories exist. It may be the case that we, in fact, inhabit a less probable world. The authors also suggest that MWI can help us to think about causation in history. Georg Gangl likewise studies the nature of causality in his research paper. Gangl argues that historiography shares the same form of explanation, causal narrative explanation, as other historical sciences, such as evolutionary biology and paleontology. According to Gangl, “historians track with their narratives ... ‘causal networks’ that spread through time,” which seems to take us beyond the historian-narrator’s world to the real mechanisms of the past. Yet,
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
10
期刊介绍: Philosophy of history is a rapidly expanding area. There is growing interest today in: what constitutes knowledge of the past, the ontology of past events, the relationship of language to the past, and the nature of representations of the past. These interests are distinct from – although connected with – contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and aesthetics. Hence we need a distinct venue in which philosophers can explore these issues. Journal of the Philosophy of History provides such a venue. Ever since neo-Kantianism, philosophy of history has been central to all of philosophy, whether or not particular philosophers recognized its potential significance.
期刊最新文献
Speaking of Facts: or, Reality without Realism Stories Are Still Not Lived but Told What Is Historical Anti-realism and How to Define It? Intuition Is Not Enough The Past in Question: History as Past and Present Problem-Spaces
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