{"title":"Chisholm关于必要的后验","authors":"M. Wreen","doi":"10.5406/21521026.39.3.06","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Roderick Chisholm addressed the issue of the necessary a posteriori on at least three occasions and, characteristically, modified his views over time. He first advanced a three-stage argument that concluded that no necessary truths are known a posteriori. Without abandoning that argument, he later weakened its conclusion, claiming only that not all knowledge of necessary truths is a posteriori. In the main, this paper is a detailed critical exposition of Chisholm's arguments. However, it also picks up on some suggestive remarks of Chisholm's, draws them out, and explores them.","PeriodicalId":53558,"journal":{"name":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Chisholm on the Necessary A Posteriori\",\"authors\":\"M. Wreen\",\"doi\":\"10.5406/21521026.39.3.06\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Roderick Chisholm addressed the issue of the necessary a posteriori on at least three occasions and, characteristically, modified his views over time. He first advanced a three-stage argument that concluded that no necessary truths are known a posteriori. Without abandoning that argument, he later weakened its conclusion, claiming only that not all knowledge of necessary truths is a posteriori. In the main, this paper is a detailed critical exposition of Chisholm's arguments. However, it also picks up on some suggestive remarks of Chisholm's, draws them out, and explores them.\",\"PeriodicalId\":53558,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"History of Philosophy Quarterly\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"History of Philosophy Quarterly\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.06\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"History of Philosophy Quarterly","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5406/21521026.39.3.06","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
Roderick Chisholm addressed the issue of the necessary a posteriori on at least three occasions and, characteristically, modified his views over time. He first advanced a three-stage argument that concluded that no necessary truths are known a posteriori. Without abandoning that argument, he later weakened its conclusion, claiming only that not all knowledge of necessary truths is a posteriori. In the main, this paper is a detailed critical exposition of Chisholm's arguments. However, it also picks up on some suggestive remarks of Chisholm's, draws them out, and explores them.