Thomas G. Fleming, Bastián González-Bustamante, Petra Schleiter
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Cabinet Reshuffles and Parliamentary No-Confidence Motions
How do cabinet reshuffles affect the parliamentary opposition's use of no-confidence motions in the government? Opposition parties employ no-confidence motions as electoral signals to highlight government incompetence and to position themselves as a government in waiting. We argue that cabinet reshuffles – which prime ministers use to respond to policy failures, scandals, poor ministerial performance and disloyalty – present an opportunity for the opposition to deploy no-confidence motions to this end. The incentives to deploy this strategy, however, are contingent on the nature of the party system and are greatest where party-system concentration positions a single opposition party as the alternative to the government and sole beneficiary of a no-confidence vote. We test this expectation using a multilevel modelling approach applied to data on reshuffles in 316 governments and 16 parliamentary democracies, and find support for our expectation: cabinet reshuffles raise the probability of no-confidence motions conditional on party-system concentration.
期刊介绍:
Government and Opposition has been a leading international journal of comparative politics for over 40 years. Its distinctive voice amongst politics journals has ensured a large, worldwide circulation. Government and Opposition"s interests include: - developments in the theory and practice of democracy, including significant elections the evolution of political parties, and the consequences of new political challenges for governments and oppositions - the governance of the global economy and the implications of interdependence worldwide politics - including the politics of the European Union - major issues of public policy, especially from a comparative perspective theoretical and ethical dimensions of political issues and policy.