团队推理不能被视为回报转换

IF 1.2 2区 哲学 Q3 ECONOMICS Economics and Philosophy Pub Date : 2022-11-17 DOI:10.1017/s026626712200027x
A. Colman
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本杂志最近的一篇文章中,Duijf声称已经证明了团队推理可以被视为一种回报转换。他的形式化模仿了团队推理,但忽略了其重要的代理转换。这种收益转换的可能性从未被怀疑,这并不意味着团队推理可以被视为收益转换,在收益代表玩家效用的游戏中也没有意义。这里证明了一个定理,即一个更简单、更直观的回报转换可以模仿任何预测玩家在定义明确的游戏中会选择什么策略的理论。
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Team reasoning cannot be viewed as a payoff transformation
In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation. His formalization mimics team reasoning but ignores its essential agency switch. The possibility of such a payoff transformation was never in doubt, does not imply that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation, and makes no sense in a game in which payoffs represent players’ utilities. A theorem is proved here that a simpler and more intuitive payoff transformation can mimic any theory that predicts what strategies players will choose in a well-defined game.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
8.30%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: The disciplines of economics and philosophy each possess their own special analytical methods, whose combination is powerful and fruitful. Each discipline can be enriched by the other. Economics and Philosophy aims to promote their mutual enrichment by publishing articles and book reviews in all areas linking these subjects. Topics include the methodology and epistemology of economics, the foundations of decision theory and game theory, the nature of rational choice in general, historical work on economics with a philosophical purpose, ethical issues in economics, the use of economic techniques in ethical theory, and many other subjects.
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