The West and the birth of Bangladesh: foreign policy in the face of mass atrocity

institutionalisation of the region as the Alps-Adriatic Working Community in 1982 was a successful implementation of the Helsinki Accords, and what the author calls ‘détente from below’ (p. 202). Petar Dragišić’s analysis of Yugoslavia’s relations with the Vatican shows that while most of the Western world was willing to cooperate with Tito after 1948, the Holy See remained an outlier, primarily due to Pope Pius XII’s ardent anticommunism. Pius’ successors, however, were invested in dialogue with socialist states, facilitating better relations and eventually leading to the Vatican accepting a non-political role in Yugoslavia and the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970, despite resistance from domestic Church representatives. Yugoslavia’s European turn during the 1970s is best exemplified by its relations with the EEC. Branislav Radeljić argues that although Yugoslavia was eager to maintain good relations with individual EEC member-states, it struggled to find common ground with the organisation as a whole. Balancing between its socialist status and reaping the rewards of closer ties with the EEC proved difficult, leading Belgrade to consider abandoning the rapprochement with Brussels. However, the EEC feared a possible crisis following Tito’s death, pushing Brussels to accept Yugoslavia’s political system and offer it a favourable cooperation agreement – including easier access to loans. This agreement helped to stabilise the Yugoslav government in the aftermath of Tito’s passing. Benedetto Zacharia’s chapter on Yugoslav prime minister Ante Marković’s economic reforms in 1989–90 demonstrates how the European Community (EC) became increasingly involved in aiding the Yugoslav government following Tito’s death. As a key element of his reforms, Marković pursued closer ties with the EC, but despite active engagement from both sides, he failed to devise a timely and viable strategy for his reforms, contributing to Yugoslavia’s eventual disintegration. Meanwhile, the EC’s role transformed from that of an economic partner to one of mediator. While one might have expected more focus on Yugoslavia’s relations with the Global South, this volume is nevertheless a strong contribution to the concept of a Global Cold War. It demonstrates that Yugoslavia’s foreign policy had a global influence, but that it also shaped regional relations with its neighbours and Central Europe and Balkan security, creating unlikely connections across local geopolitical divides. Breaking Down Bipolarity reinforces the argument that, despite ideological foundations, Yugoslav foreign policy was often driven by pragmatism. As such, this volume will be a valuable resource for students and historians studying Yugoslavia and the broader politics of non-alignment during the Cold War.