知情利他主义和功利主义

B. Rosebury
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引用次数: 0

摘要

功利主义是一种结果主义理论,它公正地为每个人的幸福分配价值。本文介绍的知情利他主义是一种意向主义理论,它将结果主义和公正性都降级为从属角色。它将道德上正确或值得赞扬的行动(包括法律和政策等集体行动)确定为那些出于充分知情的意图而造福而非伤害他人的行动。该理论的一个含义是,多个主体可能会执行不相容的行为,但每个主体在道德意义上都是正确的。
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Informed Altruism and Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory that assigns value impartially to the well-being of each person. Informed Altruism, introduced in this article, is an intentionalist theory that relegates both consequentialism and impartiality to subordinate roles. It identifies morally right or commendable actions (including collective actions such as laws and policies) as those motivated by a sufficiently informed intention to benefit and not harm others. An implication of the theory is that multiple agents may perform incompatible actions and yet each be acting rightly in a moral sense.
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