管理层劳动力市场流动与企业社会责任

IF 1.4 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2022-07-27 DOI:10.2308/jmar-2021-067
Yonghong Jia, Xinghua Gao, Lily H. Fang
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引用次数: 1

摘要

州法院对不可避免的披露原则(IDD)的交错拒绝增加了管理层和普通员工劳动力市场的流动性。Flammer和Kacperczyk(2019)报告了IDD拒绝对企业社会责任(CSR)的积极影响,并将这一发现解释为管理者利用企业社会责任留住员工。作为另一种解释,我们提出并测试了增加其外部就业潜力的管理激励措施。我们发现,当行业公司更有可能聘请外部首席执行官,外部锦标赛奖金更高时,IDD拒绝的影响更大,而当首席执行官被未经授权的股权授予所阻碍,治理控制更强时,IDD排斥的影响更弱。我们没有发现IDD拒绝效应随员工激励而变化。我们进一步发现,企业社会责任投资确实有助于首席执行官通过提高总薪酬和获得新高管职位的可能性来获得备受追捧的个人利益。
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Managerial Labor Market Mobility and Corporate Social Responsibility
The staggered rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) by state courts increases the mobility of both managerial and rank-and-file employee labor markets. Flammer and Kacperczyk (2019) report a positive impact of the IDD rejection on firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) and interpret the finding as managers using CSR to retain employees. We propose and test managerial incentives to grow their external employment potential as another explanation. We find that the IDD rejection impact is stronger when industry firms are more likely to hire external CEOs and when external tournament prizes are greater, and weaker when CEOs are held up by unvested equity grants and when governance control is stronger. We fail to find that the IDD rejection effect varies with employee incentives. We further find that CSR investment does help CEOs obtain sought-after personal benefits by increasing their total pay and the likelihood of landing a new executive position.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.90
自引率
5.90%
发文量
21
期刊介绍: The mission of the Journal of Management Accounting Research (JMAR) is to advance the theory and practice of management accounting through publication of high-quality applied and theoretical research, using any well-executed research method. JMAR serves the global community of scholars and practitioners whose work impacts or is informed by the role that accounting information plays in decision-making and performance measurement within organizations. Settings may include profit and not-for profit organizations, service, retail and manufacturing organizations and domestic, foreign, and multinational firms. JMAR furthermore seeks to advance an understanding of management accounting in its broader context, such as issues related to the interface between internal and external reporting or taxation. New theories, topical areas, and research methods, as well as original research with novel implications to improve practice and disseminate the best managerial accounting practices are encouraged.
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