{"title":"两极分化时代的芬诺悖论:两极分化如何降低公众对国会和立法者的评价","authors":"B. Bae, Carlos Algara","doi":"10.1080/07343469.2022.2110995","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Fenno (1975) famously posited that the mass public’s assessments of the U.S. Congress are rooted in a paradox, with citizens holding negative evaluations of the collective Congress while holding favorable views of their individual members of Congress. Since the conceptualization of “Fenno’s Paradox,” Congress underwent pronounced changes due to increased ideological polarization between increasingly homogeneous parties comprised of more partisan loyal, ideologically extreme legislators. In this article, we ask whether this partisan polarization shifted the public’s assessments of Congress and their individual representatives over time. Leveraging over 45 years of new data measuring the monthly approval of Congress and legislators with generalized error correction models, we find that greater polarization lowers the approval rating of both over time, suggesting that greater polarization weakens Fenno’s Paradox by considerably lowering legislator approval. We explore the underlying mechanism of this finding at the individual level, finding that co-partisan support for Congress and opposing-partisan support for legislators has collapsed since 1980. Taken together, our results suggest that partisan polarization plays a large role in motivating the historic decline in congressional approval and the ability of legislators to amass a personal incumbency advantage.","PeriodicalId":41473,"journal":{"name":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Fenno’s Paradox in a Polarized Age: How Polarization Lowers the Mass Public’s Assessments of Congress and Legislators\",\"authors\":\"B. Bae, Carlos Algara\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/07343469.2022.2110995\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Fenno (1975) famously posited that the mass public’s assessments of the U.S. Congress are rooted in a paradox, with citizens holding negative evaluations of the collective Congress while holding favorable views of their individual members of Congress. Since the conceptualization of “Fenno’s Paradox,” Congress underwent pronounced changes due to increased ideological polarization between increasingly homogeneous parties comprised of more partisan loyal, ideologically extreme legislators. In this article, we ask whether this partisan polarization shifted the public’s assessments of Congress and their individual representatives over time. Leveraging over 45 years of new data measuring the monthly approval of Congress and legislators with generalized error correction models, we find that greater polarization lowers the approval rating of both over time, suggesting that greater polarization weakens Fenno’s Paradox by considerably lowering legislator approval. We explore the underlying mechanism of this finding at the individual level, finding that co-partisan support for Congress and opposing-partisan support for legislators has collapsed since 1980. Taken together, our results suggest that partisan polarization plays a large role in motivating the historic decline in congressional approval and the ability of legislators to amass a personal incumbency advantage.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41473,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.9000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2022.2110995\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Congress & The Presidency-A Journal of Capital Studies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/07343469.2022.2110995","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Fenno’s Paradox in a Polarized Age: How Polarization Lowers the Mass Public’s Assessments of Congress and Legislators
Abstract Fenno (1975) famously posited that the mass public’s assessments of the U.S. Congress are rooted in a paradox, with citizens holding negative evaluations of the collective Congress while holding favorable views of their individual members of Congress. Since the conceptualization of “Fenno’s Paradox,” Congress underwent pronounced changes due to increased ideological polarization between increasingly homogeneous parties comprised of more partisan loyal, ideologically extreme legislators. In this article, we ask whether this partisan polarization shifted the public’s assessments of Congress and their individual representatives over time. Leveraging over 45 years of new data measuring the monthly approval of Congress and legislators with generalized error correction models, we find that greater polarization lowers the approval rating of both over time, suggesting that greater polarization weakens Fenno’s Paradox by considerably lowering legislator approval. We explore the underlying mechanism of this finding at the individual level, finding that co-partisan support for Congress and opposing-partisan support for legislators has collapsed since 1980. Taken together, our results suggest that partisan polarization plays a large role in motivating the historic decline in congressional approval and the ability of legislators to amass a personal incumbency advantage.