Reappraising Plato’s Cratylus

Abstract While the argument of Plato’s Cratylus supports both the claim that there is a natural correctness of names and the claim that correct names need not be descriptions or imitations of their referents, the protagonists of the Cratylus find it infeasible to reconcile these two claims. In my paper, I account for this puzzling observation by elaborating a novel interpretation of the Cratylus. I show that the protagonists of the Cratylus are unable to make sense of the results of their joined investigation because they rely on a mistaken preconception of what a correct name is. Based on this diagnosis, I contend that Plato wants his readers to comprehend and overcome the dialectical predicament of his protagonists. I thus illuminate both the internal logic of the Cratylus and the philosophical agenda Plato pursues in staging a dialogue with this particular internal logic.