司法止赎程序是否有助于拖欠次级抵押贷款的借款人?

IF 1.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW Journal of Empirical Legal Studies Pub Date : 2022-04-30 DOI:10.1111/jels.12314
Aidong Adam Ding, Shaonan Tian, Yan Yu, Xinlei Zhao
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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们对司法止赎程序是否以及如何帮助次级抵押贷款借款人在止赎清算之外恢复其拖欠贷款进行了全面分析。尽管在非司法州,各种退出类型的过渡率都更高,但我们认为,随着时间的推移,非司法州拖欠抵押贷款的数量减少得更快,这可能会机械地推动这种更高的比率。基于在抵押贷款首次逾期90天之后长达5年的时间内各种退出类型的累积比例,我们发现司法州为拖欠借款人提供了更多的机会,使其在止赎清算之外恢复贷款,特别是在住房市场低迷期间。在2007-2008年期间,治愈、修改和偿还都是解决严重拖欠的重要替代方法。在2009年修改条款被广泛使用后,贷款修改条款成为次级借款人在取消抵押品赎回权清算之外恢复其拖欠抵押贷款的最重要选择。司法止赎利益的最大份额出现在止赎程序开始之后。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

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Does judicial foreclosure procedure help delinquent subprime mortgage borrowers?

We conduct comprehensive analyses on whether and how the judicial foreclosure procedure helps subprime mortgage borrowers to reinstate their delinquent loans outside foreclosure liquidation. Even though the transition rates of various exit types are all higher in non-judicial states, we argue such higher rates can be mechanically driven by the faster shrinking pool of delinquent mortgages in non-judicial states over time. Based on the cumulative proportions of various exit types during a period of up to 5 years post the mortgage first become 90 days past due, we find that judicial states offer more opportunities for delinquent borrowers to reinstate their loans outside foreclosure liquidation, especially during a housing market downturn. Cures, modifications, and paid-offs were all important alternative ways to resolve serious delinquencies during 2007–2008. After modifications became widely available in 2009, loan modifications became the most important alternative for subprime borrowers to reinstate their delinquent mortgages outside foreclosure liquidation. The lion's share of the judicial foreclosure benefit shows up after the start of the foreclosure process.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
11.80%
发文量
34
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