Weak Affects in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

Abstract:This paper takes Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a weak-theoretic body of work conditioned and characterized by weak affectivity: a philosophy that similarly avoids strong stances and strong feelings. This renders it vulnerable not only to attack, but to defense: attempts to defend Wittgenstein from accusations of complacency and quietism tend to resort to affectively and theoretically strong interpretations that move against the grain of his own writings. What, then, is generative or productive about weakness, if it invites attacks against which it cannot defend itself? Drawing from Sianne Ngai's studies of weak affects and aesthetics, I argue that Wittgenstein's persistent replication of weak affects is a condition of his inquiry into ordinary life and language—that ordinariness has a structural weakness, which Wittgenstein's writings invite us to practice.