自由意志是一种更高层次的现象?

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q1 Arts and Humanities Thought-A Journal of Philosophy Pub Date : 2020-08-18 DOI:10.1002/tht3.461
Alexander Gebharter
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引用次数: 10

摘要

List(2014, 2019)最近提出了一种特殊的观点,即自由意志是一种与决定论相容的更高层次的现象。根据李斯特的观点,人们可以通过证明物理层面的决定论意味着不可能在代理层面上做其他事情来反驳他的说法。本文接受了这一挑战。基于李斯特的方法所基于的假设,我提供了一个简单的概率模型,该模型建立了物理决定论和在代理层面不可能做其他事情之间的联系,代理层面需要反驳自由意志作为一种更高层次的现象。
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Free will as a higher‐level phenomenon?
List (2014, 2019) has recently argued for a particular view of free will as a higher-level phenomenon compatible with determinism. According to List, one could refute his account by showing that determinism at the physical level implies the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level. This paper takes up that challenge. Based on assumptions to which List's approach is committed, I provide a simple probabilistic model that establishes the connection between physical determinism and the impossibility of doing otherwise at the agential level that is needed to refute free will as a higher-level phenomenon.
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期刊介绍: Thought: A Journal of Philosophy is dedicated to the publication of short (of less than 4500 words), original, philosophical papers in the following areas: Logic, Philosophy of Maths, Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, and Value Theory. All published papers will be analytic in style. We intend that readers of Thought will be exposed to the most central and significant issues and positions in contemporary philosophy that fall under its remit. We will publish only papers that exemplify the highest standard of clarity. Thought aims to give a response to all authors within eight weeks of submission. Thought employs a triple-blind review system: the author''s identity is not revealed to the editors and referees, and the referee''s identity is not revealed to the author. Every submitted paper is appraised by the Subject Editor of the relevant subject area. Papers that pass to the editors are read by at least two experts in the relevant subject area.
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