揭牌:行政简易判决与政治控制

IF 1.2 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW Yale Journal on Regulation Pub Date : 2017-05-08 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.2809199
Alexander I. Platt
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引用次数: 1

摘要

《行政程序法》关于正式裁决的规定,赋予被控行政执法行为的个人进行当面口头听证的权利。但并非总是如此。机关检察官可以在没有被告同意的情况下,通过“行政简易判决”解决案件,从而绕过正式的审理程序。1971年《哈佛法律评论》(Harvard Law Review)的一篇文章支持这一程序,认为这是机构检察官避免“徒劳”听证会的一种方式,法院基于同样的技术官僚方法支持了这一程序。然而,行政程序不仅仅是一种需要行政人员熟练校准的工具;它是一种政治控制机制。当国会将某一项目的执行委托给一个正式的裁决制度时,它是在行使自己的权力,“叠牌”,让被告有机会获得精心设计的程序保护,并限制或引导执行项目。行政即决判决“打开了甲板”——它解除了国会的程序控制,允许机构重新调整其执法重点。在美国证券交易委员会,许多行政诉讼现在都是通过“即决处置”解决的,不需要任何面对面的听证会。最近即审即裁的扩大促进了该机构执法重点向容易起诉的犯罪行为的广泛转变,使该机构能够年复一年地向国会展示“创纪录数量的执法行动”。这个数字(显然)具有重大的政治价值,但并不能说明证交会执法计划的有效性。对于SEC这样的机构来说,设定执法重点是一项关键职能。SEC负责执行大量复杂的法律义务,但它们拥有的资源只能追究相对较少的可能违规行为。证券学者长期以来一直在争论证交会的执法重点,但他们忽视了行政裁决程序在塑造这些重点方面的作用——既是国会控制的工具,也是行政反叛的工具。
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Unstacking the Deck: Administrative Summary Judgment and Political Control
The Administrative Procedure Act’s provisions on formal adjudication give individuals charged in administrative enforcement actions the right to an in-person oral hearing. But not always. Agency prosecutors can circumvent formal hearing procedures without the consent of the defendant by resolving cases on “administrative summary judgment.” A 1971 Harvard Law Review Article endorsed this procedure as a way for agency prosecutors to avoid “futile” hearings, and courts have upheld it based on the same technocratic approach. Yet administrative procedure is not merely an instrument to be expertly calibrated by administrators; it is a mechanism of political control. When Congress assigns enforcement of a given program to a formal adjudication regime, it is exercising its authority to “stack the deck,” giving defendants access to elaborate procedural protections and limiting or channeling the enforcement program. Administrative summary judgment “unstacks the deck” – it unwinds Congress’s procedural controls and allows an agency to recalibrate its enforcement priorities.At the Securities and Exchange Commission, many administrative proceedings are now resolved on “summary disposition” without any in-person hearing. The recent expansion of summary dispositions has facilitated a broad shift in the agency’s enforcement priorities towards easy-to-prosecute offenses, enabling the agency to show Congress a “record number of enforcement actions” year after year. That figure has (apparently) significant political value, but does not indicate anything about the effectiveness of the SEC’s enforcement program.Setting enforcement priorities is a critical function for agencies like the SEC that are charged with enforcing a vast and complex array of legal obligations but which have resources to pursue only a relatively small number of possible violations. Securities scholars have long debated the SEC’s enforcement priorities, but have overlooked the role administrative adjudication procedure plays in shaping those priorities – as both a vehicle for Congressional control and administrative rebellion.
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