“成为我是什么样的”:从偏执和投射到同情和自知之明

IF 0.9 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Philosophical Explorations Pub Date : 2022-11-19 DOI:10.1080/13869795.2022.2146160
L. Braddock
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引用次数: 0

摘要

投射不能可靠地服务于认知;这往往会导致知识的缺失。我们的投射不仅通过赋予世界我们自己的特征来想象性地歪曲世界。这样一来,它就会误以为我们缺乏这种功能。这是一种想象的行为,它把不想要的属性重新定位成一种有动机的错误表述,扭曲了我们对现实和我们自己的理解。想象的行为本身并不是有意识的,所以我们只考虑结果的表面价值,尽管有扭曲。如果没有强有力的理由来质疑这种误解,这种投射就不会被发现,这种误解会影响我们与他人的关系。投射服务于有动机的自我欺骗,从而逃避纠正。现实的自我认识通过精神分析成为可能,当病人的投射被分析师作为一种影响她同情能力的交流来接受时。我展示了我们在休谟和史密斯身上发现的同情心理学如何为理解同情和投射之间的相互作用提供了一个哲学框架。我将同情与当代克莱因精神分析理论结合起来,解释精神分析解释如何与这种相互作用相结合,以减少投射的影响,并使基于主体自身经验的自我认识成为可能。
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‘What it is like to be me’: from paranoia and projection to sympathy and self-knowledge
ABSTRACT Projection does not reliably serve cognition; it all too often contributes to failures of knowledge. Our projecting not only imaginatively misrepresents the world by attributing a feature of ourself to it. In doing so it can misrepresent us as lacking that feature. It is an act of the imagination which re-locates unwanted attributes into a motivated misrepresentation which distorts our grasp of reality and of ourselves. The imaginative act itself is not consciously intended so that we take the resulting picture at face value, despite the distortion. Without a strong reason to question this misperception the projection remains undetected and the misrepresentation affects our relations to others. Projection serving motivated self-deception thus evades correction. Realistic self-knowledge becomes possible through psychoanalysis when the patient's projections are received by the analyst as communications impinging on her capacity for sympathy. I show how the psychology of sympathy we find in Hume and Smith provides a philosophical frame of reference for understanding this interaction between sympathy and projection. I bring sympathy together with contemporary Kleinian psychoanalytic theory to explain how psychoanalytic interpretation engages with this interaction to reduce the effects of projection and enable a self-knowledge grounded in the subject's own experience of herself.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
16.70%
发文量
29
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