Skirting the Justice System through Presidential Clemency in Zambia: Some Critical Reflections

Presidential or executive power of pardoning convicted offenders is, generally speaking, beyond ordinary checks and balances. It could arguably be one of the most controversial of executive powers prone to abuse by the political elite. To the extent that the power sanctions the circumvention of the justice system by undoing, sidestepping, and interfering with some judicial outcomes, its appropriateness has been questioned as being possibly a serious indictment on the separation of powers and the rule of law. This contribution focuses on the use of the presidential power of clemency in Zambia as a reflective case study. It addresses some of the legitimate questions that arise from a legal and constitutional standpoint in the use of this power. The paper argues that the danger that is posed to the independence of the judiciary by the power of pardon does not derive from the mere existence of the prerogative of mercy powers, but rather from collateral factors such as the apparent failure to understand the extent to which pardoned convicts lose their rights, rather than gain them; the apparent failure to appreciate the justice protective function of the power of pardon itself; and the absence of inbuilt trigger mechanisms in the law to monitor possible abuse of the power.