Introduction

Sino-Indian relations have longbeen ‘complicated’by a series of bilateral disagreements. Rivalry and competition between these two powers are therefore becoming ever-more visible across the entire Indo-Pacific. Ever since Robert Kaplan’s Monsoon (2011), scholars have become increasingly interested in how this dynamic is playing out in the Indian Ocean. Notable contributions from just the past two years alone include Brewster’s India and China at Sea (2018), Linter’s The Costliest Pearl (2019), Basrur, Mukherjee and Paul’s India-ChinaMaritime Competition (2019), and Paul’s The India-China Rivalry in the Globalization Era (2018). Apart from the first ‘contextual’ article, this Special Edition will not, however, focus on SinoIndian rivalry directly. Instead, and in response to what we perceive as the general neglect of such matters in favor of analyzing the activities of great powers in the Indian Ocean, most of the papers in this Special Edition will examine how small andmedium-sized states in the Indian Ocean Region are responding to both the challenges and the opportunities the Sino-Indian rivalry potentially presents to them. The Indian Ocean Region is dominated in many ways by India, which accounts for roughly 75% of South Asia’s population, GDP and defence spending; India also sits astride some of the busiest trade routes in the world, not least because those routes carry goods, and especially energy resources, to China. But the Indian Ocean Region also contains a number of small and middle-powers which are increasingly economically and strategically important. Due to their geography, ties with India are intrinsically important to all of these countries; however, many also increasingly depend on China for investments and capital and, in Pakistan’s case especially, for strategic support too. All are signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding which informs China’s ambitious infrastructure-building Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While China typically talks about the BRI only in economic and ‘connectivity’ terms, its rivals allege that the BRI has a strategic dimension too. India in particular has alleged that China is improperly interfering in what New Delhi considers its ‘natural’ sphere of influence in the Indian Ocean especially. Further, some scholars, media critics – and states, including India – warn that the BRI represents a new form of imperialistic, ‘debt-trap’ diplomacy which will underpin a China-dominated New World Order. The case which is routinely raised as an example concerns Hambantota port; the allegation is that Sri Lanka was enticed to borrow too much from China and, when it was unable to repay the debt, Colombo was forced to lease the newly built port (and airport, industrial zone, etc.) to a Chinese state-owned entity for the next 99 years on unfavorable terms. All of these smaller states – with the possible exception of Pakistan – would presumably prefer to maintain good relations with both India and China. But this may not be possible, and if Sino-Indian competition/rivalry continues to grow, regional states may find themselves facing difficult choices. On the other hand, there is evidence of smaller states extracting benefits from both China and India. Ultimately which dynamic prevails arguably depends on contextual factors which may also change over time.