Nuclear India and the Changing Landscape of Escalation in Southern Asia

The theory of the nuclear revolution posits that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, coupled with the ease with which mutual second-strike capabilities can be obtained and secured, has made mutual vulnerability an undeniable fact. This reality has made military victories impossible to achieve in a conflict between two nuclear-armed states. As a result, the status quo is easier to maintain, given that the security of a state in possession of survivable and secure second-strike capabilities is guaranteed. This, according to the theory, is the case because nuclear weapons attenuate or even eliminate the rather destabilizing security dilemma that has hitherto increased mistrust between rivals and competitors. The size of an adversary’s arsenal, or the overall military imbalance, becomes irrelevant. Moreover, nuclear superiority does not matter under conditions of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Overall, the theory posits that nuclear weapons make states more secure. Further, by eliminating the quest for winning a series of security competitions, they help to make the world safer. That countries with nuclear weapons hold hostage things that other nuclear states value is an indication that mutual vulnerabilities induce general stability. If states were to accept MAD, their proclivities to use force as an instrument of foreign policy might decline significantly. That would have payoffs in the form of infrequent crises and increased cooperation between states. With nuclear weapons making superiority— whether conventional or nuclear—less decisive, powerful states are hamstrung in acting punitively against weaker states. In a fundamental difference from conventional wars, a state cannot achieve deterrence by denial by threatening to attack its enemy’s armed forces, given its adversary’s ability to achieve deterrence by punishment by retaliating. The archetypal example of this phenomenon is the nuclear-tinged rivalry between Washington and