主要前提的分类及其对证伪和验证的影响

IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q2 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE International Studies in the Philosophy of Science Pub Date : 2020-10-01 DOI:10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845
D. Trafimow
{"title":"主要前提的分类及其对证伪和验证的影响","authors":"D. Trafimow","doi":"10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Both naïve and sophisticated falsification arguments depend upon using the logic of modus tollens to employ empirical defeats to conclude that the theory is not true (naïve falsification) or that the conjunction of theory and auxiliary assumptions is not true (sophisticated falsification). However, both types of modus tollens syllogisms depend strongly on the precise form of the major premise. The present goal is to introduce a taxonomy of four types of major premises: positive frame, negative frame, positive-negative frame, and negative-positive frame. For two frames, falsification really is logically superior to verification, but for two other frames, verification is logically superior to falsification. Thus, there is no overall logical basis for preferring falsification to verification or for preferring verification to falsification. Nor are there convincing arguments from Bayesian statistical, frequentist statistical, or empirical standpoints. Thus, the attraction of falsification, whether naïve or sophisticated, comes down, in the end, to something other than an objective philosophical account.","PeriodicalId":44433,"journal":{"name":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","volume":"33 1","pages":"211 - 229"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2020-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Taxonomy of Major Premises and Implications for Falsification and Verification\",\"authors\":\"D. Trafimow\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT Both naïve and sophisticated falsification arguments depend upon using the logic of modus tollens to employ empirical defeats to conclude that the theory is not true (naïve falsification) or that the conjunction of theory and auxiliary assumptions is not true (sophisticated falsification). However, both types of modus tollens syllogisms depend strongly on the precise form of the major premise. The present goal is to introduce a taxonomy of four types of major premises: positive frame, negative frame, positive-negative frame, and negative-positive frame. For two frames, falsification really is logically superior to verification, but for two other frames, verification is logically superior to falsification. Thus, there is no overall logical basis for preferring falsification to verification or for preferring verification to falsification. Nor are there convincing arguments from Bayesian statistical, frequentist statistical, or empirical standpoints. Thus, the attraction of falsification, whether naïve or sophisticated, comes down, in the end, to something other than an objective philosophical account.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44433,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"211 - 229\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-10-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Studies in the Philosophy of Science","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2021.1964845","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1

摘要

naïve和复杂证伪论证都依赖于使用模态逻辑来利用经验失败来得出理论不正确的结论(naïve证伪),或者理论和辅助假设的结合不正确(复杂证伪)。然而,这两种模式的三段论都强烈地依赖于大前提的精确形式。目前的目标是介绍四种主要前提的分类:积极框架、消极框架、积极-消极框架和消极-积极框架。对于两个框架,证伪在逻辑上确实优于证伪,但对于另外两个框架,证伪在逻辑上优于证伪。因此,没有总体的逻辑基础来支持证伪而不是验证,或者支持验证而不是证伪。也没有令人信服的论据从贝叶斯统计,频率统计,或经验的立场。因此,证伪的吸引力,无论是naïve还是复杂的,最终都归结于客观的哲学叙述之外的东西。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
查看原文
分享 分享
微信好友 朋友圈 QQ好友 复制链接
本刊更多论文
A Taxonomy of Major Premises and Implications for Falsification and Verification
ABSTRACT Both naïve and sophisticated falsification arguments depend upon using the logic of modus tollens to employ empirical defeats to conclude that the theory is not true (naïve falsification) or that the conjunction of theory and auxiliary assumptions is not true (sophisticated falsification). However, both types of modus tollens syllogisms depend strongly on the precise form of the major premise. The present goal is to introduce a taxonomy of four types of major premises: positive frame, negative frame, positive-negative frame, and negative-positive frame. For two frames, falsification really is logically superior to verification, but for two other frames, verification is logically superior to falsification. Thus, there is no overall logical basis for preferring falsification to verification or for preferring verification to falsification. Nor are there convincing arguments from Bayesian statistical, frequentist statistical, or empirical standpoints. Thus, the attraction of falsification, whether naïve or sophisticated, comes down, in the end, to something other than an objective philosophical account.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE-
自引率
12.50%
发文量
10
期刊介绍: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science is a scholarly journal dedicated to publishing original research in philosophy of science and in philosophically informed history and sociology of science. Its scope includes the foundations and methodology of the natural, social, and human sciences, philosophical implications of particular scientific theories, and broader philosophical reflection on science. The editors invite contributions not only from philosophers, historians, and sociologists of science, but also from researchers in the sciences. The journal publishes articles from a wide variety of countries and philosophical traditions.
期刊最新文献
Tightrope-Walking Rationality in Action: Feyerabendian Insights for the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics Natural Selection, Mechanism and Phenomenon Are the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) Applicable in Determining the Optimal Fit and Simplicity of Mechanistic Models? Reviewers Acknowledgement Defending a Realist Stance
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
现在去查看 取消
×
提示
确定
0
微信
客服QQ
Book学术公众号 扫码关注我们
反馈
×
意见反馈
请填写您的意见或建议
请填写您的手机或邮箱
已复制链接
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
×
扫码分享
扫码分享
Book学术官方微信
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术
文献互助 智能选刊 最新文献 互助须知 联系我们:info@booksci.cn
Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。
Copyright © 2023 Book学术 All rights reserved.
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号 京ICP备2023020795号-1