{"title":"组织结构与CEO支配地位","authors":"C. Schumacher","doi":"10.5465/AMBPP.2016.13612ABSTRACT","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We explore the effects of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) personal dominance—an idiosyncratic character trait strongly associated with a desire for influence and control—on two fundamental organizational design decisions: the CEO’s span of control (1) and her delegation of responsibilities as reflected in the appointment of a chief operating officer (COO) (2). Linking three original measures of CEO dominance based on quarterly earnings calls with manually collected data on span of control and COO positions for a sample of CEOs presiding over large US corporations, we demonstrate that CEOs who are high in dominance have a significantly larger personal span of control and delegate fewer decision rights than less-dominant CEOs. We discuss implications of our findings and future questions from an organizational design perspective.","PeriodicalId":36404,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Organization Design","volume":"1 1","pages":"1-16"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Organizational structure and CEO dominance\",\"authors\":\"C. Schumacher\",\"doi\":\"10.5465/AMBPP.2016.13612ABSTRACT\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We explore the effects of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) personal dominance—an idiosyncratic character trait strongly associated with a desire for influence and control—on two fundamental organizational design decisions: the CEO’s span of control (1) and her delegation of responsibilities as reflected in the appointment of a chief operating officer (COO) (2). Linking three original measures of CEO dominance based on quarterly earnings calls with manually collected data on span of control and COO positions for a sample of CEOs presiding over large US corporations, we demonstrate that CEOs who are high in dominance have a significantly larger personal span of control and delegate fewer decision rights than less-dominant CEOs. We discuss implications of our findings and future questions from an organizational design perspective.\",\"PeriodicalId\":36404,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Organization Design\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"1-16\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-02-09\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Organization Design\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2016.13612ABSTRACT\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Organization Design","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5465/AMBPP.2016.13612ABSTRACT","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
We explore the effects of chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) personal dominance—an idiosyncratic character trait strongly associated with a desire for influence and control—on two fundamental organizational design decisions: the CEO’s span of control (1) and her delegation of responsibilities as reflected in the appointment of a chief operating officer (COO) (2). Linking three original measures of CEO dominance based on quarterly earnings calls with manually collected data on span of control and COO positions for a sample of CEOs presiding over large US corporations, we demonstrate that CEOs who are high in dominance have a significantly larger personal span of control and delegate fewer decision rights than less-dominant CEOs. We discuss implications of our findings and future questions from an organizational design perspective.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Organization Design is the intellectual home of organization design thinking. Drawing on a wide variety of disciplines, organization design analyzes how organizations work, and how they can work better, focusing on the choices about structures, systems, and processes that drive various organizational outcomes.
The journal advances understanding of topics important to academic researchers and industry professionals alike. We aim to publish novel research and commentary on known or emerging organization design concepts and phenomena; examine new technologies for the design and management of organizations; derive practical implications from existing studies; and analyze new and unusual forms of organizing.
We welcome high-quality submissions that expand on the foundations of organization design and uncover new phenomena. Uniquely, authors can choose from numerous article formats, providing customized vehicles for expression. Articles are peer-reviewed, written, and read not only by design scholars, but also by managers within organizations.