反对关于心理态度的规范主义

IF 0.6 2区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY Analytic Philosophy Pub Date : 2021-07-27 DOI:10.1111/phib.12243
Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini
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引用次数: 0

摘要

规范主义者认为,心灵本质上是规范性的,任何对我们的心理态度的适当描述都必须包含规范性的术语和判断。特别是,规范主义的一个流派捍卫了心理态度由构成性规范定义的主张。与此相反,反规范主义者提出了精神状态的非规范描述。本文的目的是通过削弱一个支持规范主义的关键论点来支持反规范主义。
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Against normativism about mental attitudes

Normativists argue that the mind is essentially normative and any adequate account of our mental attitudes must involve normative terms and judgments. In particular, one brand of Normativism defends the claim that mental attitudes are defined by constitutive norms. Against this, Anti-normativists have offered non-normative accounts of mental states.The goal of this paper is to bolster Anti-normativism by undermining one key argument in favor of Normativism.

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来源期刊
Analytic Philosophy
Analytic Philosophy PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
1.10
自引率
0.00%
发文量
34
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