Liberal Relativism’s Challenge to Conscience Rights

I argue that within contemporary liberal theory and case law is a relativistic conception of conscience, a conception which has the effect of obscuring the significance of conscience and downplaying the importance of conscience rights. The article focuses in particular on the right to conscientious objection. After outlining a representative cohort of cases from within contemporary liberalism concerning conscientious objection I analyse Cardinal Ratzinger’s (Pope Emeritus Benedict XVI) ‘dictatorship of relativism’ critique for its cogency as a response to these cases. I contend that although the ‘dictatorship of relativism’ critique is almost always understood in a univocal manner it is in fact comprised of two logically distinct arguments. One of these is found fundamentally flawed while the other is deemed promising yet in need of supplementation and defence. This I attempt via an analysis of the understanding of conscience present within contemporary liberal case law and theory. I go on to claim that contemporary liberalism, in part due to its problematic understanding of conscience, is often insufficiently respectful of an important principle of conscience rights protection when it dismisses claims of conscientious objection. The final part of the article is an attempt at explaining the paradox of a liberalism which readily justifies significant restrictions on conscience rights. I end by concluding that one version of the ‘dictatorship of relativism’ critique, suitably clarified and supplemented, is basically sound and poses a very serious challenge to contemporary liberalism.