{"title":"对Mongin和Vaïsse的文章“不适合目的:重新评估法国核武器的发展和部署(1956-74)”的回应","authors":"D. Mongin, Maurice Vaïsse","doi":"10.1080/14682745.2023.2207316","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The article ‘Unfit for Purpose: Reassessing the Development and Deployment of French Nuclear Weapons (1956–74)’, which Benoît Pelopidas and Sébastien Philippe coauthored in 2020 in Cold War History, calls for a certain number of comments on our part. These relate, above all, to the scholarly nature of their work, both in terms of content and method. Our comments are all the more forceful in that, although the authors focus on the period from 1956 to 1974, they do not hesitate to extrapolate their conclusions to the contemporary period, so as to cast doubt on French strategy. There is, therefore, a methodological and ideological bias, which, in our view, undermines the scholarly rigour of this publication. The first methodological problem with this article is the implication that it provides new evidence (‘we provide evidence that challenges established claims in French nuclear history’) – in particular through the use of the oral archives of Admiral Marcel Duval, former director of the Revue de défense nationale – by asserting that ‘traditional’ historiography had supposedly failed to cover the difficulties encountered by France in the initial stages of establishing its nuclear deterrent. This assertion is all the more untrue as the article in question is partly based on the consultation of interview transcripts from Admiral Duval with the agreement of Maurice Vaïsse, which was a sign of trust. ‘Technology repeatedly determined French nuclear choices negatively. For example, the decision to build the air component of the nuclear arsenal first was due to the inability to build longrange ballistic missiles’, say Pelopidas and Philippe. But this statement is completely removed from its historical context. In support of this thesis, they cite the case of the Mirage IV bomber, which became operational in 1964. One might mention at this point that there were public announcements by the Mollet Government as early as November 1956 in favour of a mediumand long-range strategic bomber, as the most effective weapon of retaliation until ballistic missiles were ready. Indeed, in the mid1950s, the French government gave priority to the bomber to equip its future nuclear deterrent force, but this was because, at the time, it was the only system likely to become operational in the short term. For the record, the United States had been forced to make the same choice, and the first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were not operational until 1960. Moreover, General François Maurin (French Armed Forces Chief of Staff from French Armed Forces Chief of Staff, 1971-75) stated that, after a","PeriodicalId":46099,"journal":{"name":"Cold War History","volume":"23 1","pages":"459 - 463"},"PeriodicalIF":0.4000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Response to the article ‘Unfit for purpose: reassessing the development and deployment of French nuclear weapons (1956–74)’ by Mongin and Vaïsse\",\"authors\":\"D. Mongin, Maurice Vaïsse\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/14682745.2023.2207316\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The article ‘Unfit for Purpose: Reassessing the Development and Deployment of French Nuclear Weapons (1956–74)’, which Benoît Pelopidas and Sébastien Philippe coauthored in 2020 in Cold War History, calls for a certain number of comments on our part. These relate, above all, to the scholarly nature of their work, both in terms of content and method. Our comments are all the more forceful in that, although the authors focus on the period from 1956 to 1974, they do not hesitate to extrapolate their conclusions to the contemporary period, so as to cast doubt on French strategy. There is, therefore, a methodological and ideological bias, which, in our view, undermines the scholarly rigour of this publication. The first methodological problem with this article is the implication that it provides new evidence (‘we provide evidence that challenges established claims in French nuclear history’) – in particular through the use of the oral archives of Admiral Marcel Duval, former director of the Revue de défense nationale – by asserting that ‘traditional’ historiography had supposedly failed to cover the difficulties encountered by France in the initial stages of establishing its nuclear deterrent. This assertion is all the more untrue as the article in question is partly based on the consultation of interview transcripts from Admiral Duval with the agreement of Maurice Vaïsse, which was a sign of trust. ‘Technology repeatedly determined French nuclear choices negatively. For example, the decision to build the air component of the nuclear arsenal first was due to the inability to build longrange ballistic missiles’, say Pelopidas and Philippe. But this statement is completely removed from its historical context. In support of this thesis, they cite the case of the Mirage IV bomber, which became operational in 1964. One might mention at this point that there were public announcements by the Mollet Government as early as November 1956 in favour of a mediumand long-range strategic bomber, as the most effective weapon of retaliation until ballistic missiles were ready. Indeed, in the mid1950s, the French government gave priority to the bomber to equip its future nuclear deterrent force, but this was because, at the time, it was the only system likely to become operational in the short term. For the record, the United States had been forced to make the same choice, and the first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were not operational until 1960. 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Response to the article ‘Unfit for purpose: reassessing the development and deployment of French nuclear weapons (1956–74)’ by Mongin and Vaïsse
The article ‘Unfit for Purpose: Reassessing the Development and Deployment of French Nuclear Weapons (1956–74)’, which Benoît Pelopidas and Sébastien Philippe coauthored in 2020 in Cold War History, calls for a certain number of comments on our part. These relate, above all, to the scholarly nature of their work, both in terms of content and method. Our comments are all the more forceful in that, although the authors focus on the period from 1956 to 1974, they do not hesitate to extrapolate their conclusions to the contemporary period, so as to cast doubt on French strategy. There is, therefore, a methodological and ideological bias, which, in our view, undermines the scholarly rigour of this publication. The first methodological problem with this article is the implication that it provides new evidence (‘we provide evidence that challenges established claims in French nuclear history’) – in particular through the use of the oral archives of Admiral Marcel Duval, former director of the Revue de défense nationale – by asserting that ‘traditional’ historiography had supposedly failed to cover the difficulties encountered by France in the initial stages of establishing its nuclear deterrent. This assertion is all the more untrue as the article in question is partly based on the consultation of interview transcripts from Admiral Duval with the agreement of Maurice Vaïsse, which was a sign of trust. ‘Technology repeatedly determined French nuclear choices negatively. For example, the decision to build the air component of the nuclear arsenal first was due to the inability to build longrange ballistic missiles’, say Pelopidas and Philippe. But this statement is completely removed from its historical context. In support of this thesis, they cite the case of the Mirage IV bomber, which became operational in 1964. One might mention at this point that there were public announcements by the Mollet Government as early as November 1956 in favour of a mediumand long-range strategic bomber, as the most effective weapon of retaliation until ballistic missiles were ready. Indeed, in the mid1950s, the French government gave priority to the bomber to equip its future nuclear deterrent force, but this was because, at the time, it was the only system likely to become operational in the short term. For the record, the United States had been forced to make the same choice, and the first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were not operational until 1960. Moreover, General François Maurin (French Armed Forces Chief of Staff from French Armed Forces Chief of Staff, 1971-75) stated that, after a