对Mongin和Vaïsse的文章“不适合目的:重新评估法国核武器的发展和部署(1956-74)”的回应

IF 0.4 2区 历史学 Q1 HISTORY Cold War History Pub Date : 2023-06-17 DOI:10.1080/14682745.2023.2207316
D. Mongin, Maurice Vaïsse
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引用次数: 0

摘要

Benoît Pelopidas和Sébastien Philippe于2020年在《冷战史》上合著的文章《不符合目的:重新评估法国核武器的发展和部署(1956–74)》呼吁我们发表一定数量的评论。最重要的是,这与他们工作的学术性质有关,无论是在内容还是方法上。我们的评论更加有力,因为尽管作者关注的是1956年至1974年这一时期,但他们毫不犹豫地将自己的结论外推到当代,从而对法国的战略提出质疑。因此,存在方法论和意识形态偏见,在我们看来,这破坏了本出版物的学术严谨性。这篇文章的第一个方法论问题是,它提供了新的证据(“我们提供的证据挑战了法国核历史上的既定主张”),特别是通过使用海军上将Marcel Duval的口头档案,法国国防部前部长声称,“传统”史学据称未能涵盖法国在建立核威慑力量的最初阶段所遇到的困难。这一说法更加不真实,因为这篇文章在一定程度上是基于对杜瓦尔上将的采访记录的咨询,并得到了莫里斯·瓦伊塞的同意,这是信任的象征。”技术一再否定法国的核选择。例如,Pelopidas和Philippe表示,决定首先建造核武库的空中部分是因为无法建造远程弹道导弹。但这一说法完全脱离了其历史背景。为了支持这一论点,他们引用了幻影IV轰炸机的案例,该轰炸机于1964年投入使用。在这一点上,有人可能会提到,莫莱特政府早在1956年11月就公开宣布支持中远程战略轰炸机,将其作为弹道导弹准备就绪之前最有效的报复武器。事实上,在20世纪50年代中期,法国政府优先考虑轰炸机,以装备其未来的核威慑力量,但这是因为当时,它是唯一可能在短期内投入使用的系统。记录在案的是,美国被迫做出同样的选择,第一批洲际弹道导弹直到1960年才投入使用。此外,François Maurin将军(法国武装部队参谋长,1971-75年)指出
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Response to the article ‘Unfit for purpose: reassessing the development and deployment of French nuclear weapons (1956–74)’ by Mongin and Vaïsse
The article ‘Unfit for Purpose: Reassessing the Development and Deployment of French Nuclear Weapons (1956–74)’, which Benoît Pelopidas and Sébastien Philippe coauthored in 2020 in Cold War History, calls for a certain number of comments on our part. These relate, above all, to the scholarly nature of their work, both in terms of content and method. Our comments are all the more forceful in that, although the authors focus on the period from 1956 to 1974, they do not hesitate to extrapolate their conclusions to the contemporary period, so as to cast doubt on French strategy. There is, therefore, a methodological and ideological bias, which, in our view, undermines the scholarly rigour of this publication. The first methodological problem with this article is the implication that it provides new evidence (‘we provide evidence that challenges established claims in French nuclear history’) – in particular through the use of the oral archives of Admiral Marcel Duval, former director of the Revue de défense nationale – by asserting that ‘traditional’ historiography had supposedly failed to cover the difficulties encountered by France in the initial stages of establishing its nuclear deterrent. This assertion is all the more untrue as the article in question is partly based on the consultation of interview transcripts from Admiral Duval with the agreement of Maurice Vaïsse, which was a sign of trust. ‘Technology repeatedly determined French nuclear choices negatively. For example, the decision to build the air component of the nuclear arsenal first was due to the inability to build longrange ballistic missiles’, say Pelopidas and Philippe. But this statement is completely removed from its historical context. In support of this thesis, they cite the case of the Mirage IV bomber, which became operational in 1964. One might mention at this point that there were public announcements by the Mollet Government as early as November 1956 in favour of a mediumand long-range strategic bomber, as the most effective weapon of retaliation until ballistic missiles were ready. Indeed, in the mid1950s, the French government gave priority to the bomber to equip its future nuclear deterrent force, but this was because, at the time, it was the only system likely to become operational in the short term. For the record, the United States had been forced to make the same choice, and the first intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) were not operational until 1960. Moreover, General François Maurin (French Armed Forces Chief of Staff from French Armed Forces Chief of Staff, 1971-75) stated that, after a
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Cold War History
Cold War History Multiple-
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