{"title":"理解中央银行的独立性","authors":"Wesley C. Marshall, Louis-Philippe Rochon","doi":"10.1080/08911916.2022.2137352","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article asks a simple question that does not have a simple answer: whose interests do independent central banks serve? Employing a Polanyian lens, we explore the many facets of independent central banks, including their history, their institutional nature and functions, and the academic debate surrounding them, in order to reach several conclusions that can hopefully continue to expand the debate regarding the issue.","PeriodicalId":44784,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Understanding Central Bank Independence\",\"authors\":\"Wesley C. Marshall, Louis-Philippe Rochon\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/08911916.2022.2137352\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract This article asks a simple question that does not have a simple answer: whose interests do independent central banks serve? Employing a Polanyian lens, we explore the many facets of independent central banks, including their history, their institutional nature and functions, and the academic debate surrounding them, in order to reach several conclusions that can hopefully continue to expand the debate regarding the issue.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44784,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-10-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/08911916.2022.2137352\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/08911916.2022.2137352","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article asks a simple question that does not have a simple answer: whose interests do independent central banks serve? Employing a Polanyian lens, we explore the many facets of independent central banks, including their history, their institutional nature and functions, and the academic debate surrounding them, in order to reach several conclusions that can hopefully continue to expand the debate regarding the issue.