Jiasi Fan, Zhexiong Tao, Jana Oehmichen, Hans van Ees
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引用次数: 0
摘要
我们研究了首席执行官的职业生涯期限对企业贿赂的影响。基于对企业投资时间跨度的研究，我们认为，在新兴市场，贿赂可能是作为一种具有长期动机的战略关系投资而实施的，因此，职业生涯跨度较长而非较短的首席执行官更有可能进行贿赂投资。利用 2010 年至 2018 年期间 2,914 家中国上市公司的样本，我们发现这一论点得到了支持。这一发现挑战了长期以来关于短期导向的首席执行官容易行贿的假设。此外，我们还阐述了国有制如何调节 CEO 职业生涯与公司贿赂投资之间的关系，从而丰富了研究内容。
CEO career horizon and corporate bribery: a strategic relationship perspective
We investigate the impact of CEO career horizon on corporate bribery. Based upon the research on time horizon of corporate investments, we argue that bribery may be implemented as an investment in strategic relationships with long-term motivations in emerging markets and, for that matter, CEOs with longer career horizons rather than shorter career horizons are more likely to make bribery investments. Using a sample of 2,914 Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2018, we find support for the argument. The finding challenges the long-held assumption that short-term oriented CEOs are prone to paying bribes. Further, we augment the research by expounding upon the way that state ownership moderates the relationship between CEO career horizon and firm bribery investment.
期刊介绍：
The Asia Pacific Journal of Management publishes original manuscripts on management and organizational research in the Asia Pacific region, encompassing Pacific Rim countries and mainland Asia. APJM focuses on the extent to which each manuscript addresses matters that pertain to the most fundamental question: “What determines organization success?” The major academic disciplines that we cover include entrepreneurship, human resource management, international business, organizational behavior, and strategic management. However, manuscripts that belong to other well-established disciplines such as accounting, economics, finance, marketing, and operations generally do not fall into the scope of APJM. We endeavor to be the major vehicle for exchange of ideas and research among management scholars within or interested in the broadly defined Asia Pacific region.Key features include:
Rigor - maintained through strict review processes, high quality global reviewers, and Editorial Advisory and Review Boards comprising prominent researchers from many countries.
Relevance - maintained by its focus on key management and organizational trends in the region.
Uniqueness - being the first and most prominent management journal published in and about the fastest growing region in the world.
Official affiliation - Asia Academy of ManagementFor more information, visit the AAOM website:www.baf.cuhk.edu.hk/asia-aom/ Officially cited as: Asia Pac J Manag
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