基于三重底线法的服装供应链三级协调

Patanjal Kumar, Dheeraj Sharma, P. Pandey
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引用次数: 3

摘要

目的服装供应链主要由地理位置遥远的供应商、制造商和零售商组成。当我们考虑到供应链中可持续性的三重底线时,供应链成员之间的协调变得困难。而且,复杂性随着各成员支配权的变化而增加。然而,在将可持续性和主导权同时纳入供应链后,渠道管理的任务变得更加复杂。为了填补这一空白,本文重点研究了协调可持续供应链的三梯队模型的机制设计和论证。本文采用非合作博弈论方法对模型进行探索。集中式和分散式供应链的各种结构都是基于玩家的支配力来考虑的。该模型采用同步和序贯博弈分析供应链代理的最优利润、渠道总利润、绿色创新水平和企业社会创新水平。分析结果表明,同时博弈优于顺序博弈。消费者对绿色和社会创新的敏感性增加了渠道总利润。我们还提出了一个线性的两部分电价契约模型。该模型提高了渠道的可持续性,促进了渠道协调的完善。通过一个数值例子,我们给出了集中和分散设置下多博弈结构的有效性。结果表明,在两部分资费契约下,同时移动博弈结构下的渠道效率最高,而在顺序移动博弈结构下的渠道效率较低。在本研究中,模型设置是确定性的,不存在信息不对称。因此,鼓励研究人员在随机和信息不对称环境下的多级可持续供应链协调模型。本文的实际意义包括发展可持续供应链协调模型的启示,以解决供应链的主导权问题、可持续性问题和渠道效率低下问题。原创性/价值本研究提出基于博弈论的三梯队可持续供应链渠道协调。
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Three-echelon apparel supply chain coordination with triple bottom line approach
PurposeAn apparel supply chain primarily consists of geographically distant suppliers, manufacturers and retailers. The coordination among the members of the supply chain becomes difficult when we consider the triple bottom line of sustainability in it. Moreover, the complexity increases with the change in dominance power of the respective members. However, the task of managing the channel further becomes complicated after incorporating sustainability and dominance power simultaneously into the supply chain. To fill this gap, this paper focuses on designing of mechanism and demonstration of three-echelon model to coordinate sustainable supply chain.Design/methodology/approachIn this paper, the noncooperative game theoretic method has been applied for the exploration of models. The various structures of the centralized and decentralized supply chain are considered on the basis of a player's dominance power. The model uses simultaneous and sequential move games to analyze optimal profit of supply chain agents, total channel profit, green innovation level and corporate social innovation level.FindingsAnalytical results show that simultaneous game performs better than the sequential game. The consumer sensitivity toward green and social innovations increases total channel profit. We also proposed a linear two-part tariff contract model. The proposed model enhances the sustainability level and leads to perfect channel coordination. Using a numerical example, we present the effectiveness of multiple game structures under centralized and decentralized settings. The results reveal that channel efficiency is the highest in the two-part tariff contract followed by a simultaneous move game structure and lower in the cases of sequential move game.Research limitations/implicationsIn this research, model setting are deterministic and there is no any information asymmetry. Therefore researchers are encouraged to study multiechelon sustainable supply chain coordination models under stochastic and information asymmetry settings.Practical implicationsThe paper includes implications for the development of sustainable supply chain coordination model to tackle the problems of dominance power, sustainability issues and lower channel efficiency of supply chain.Originality/valueThis study proposes game-theory-based three-echelon sustainable supply chain for the channel coordination.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.60
自引率
12.00%
发文量
53
期刊介绍: In today''s competitive business and industrial environment, it is essential to have an academic journal offering the most current theoretical knowledge on quality and reliability to ensure that top management is fully conversant with new thinking, techniques and developments in the field. The International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management (IJQRM) deals with all aspects of business improvements and with all aspects of manufacturing and services, from the training of (senior) managers, to innovations in organising and processing to raise standards of product and service quality. It is this unique blend of theoretical knowledge and managerial relevance that makes IJQRM a valuable resource for managers striving for higher standards.Coverage includes: -Reliability, availability & maintenance -Gauging, calibration & measurement -Life cycle costing & sustainability -Reliability Management of Systems -Service Quality -Green Marketing -Product liability -Product testing techniques & systems -Quality function deployment -Reliability & quality education & training -Productivity improvement -Performance improvement -(Regulatory) standards for quality & Quality Awards -Statistical process control -System modelling -Teamwork -Quality data & datamining
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