{"title":"培训的代理成本：来自RMB S的证据","authors":"Sanket Korgaonkar","doi":"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101030","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>This paper documents the agency costs resulting from the deeper tranching of subprime residential mortgage pools. Mortgage servicers are less likely to renegotiate delinquent loans collateralizing a greater number and variety of tranches. We find that an interquartile increase in tranching reduces mortgage servicers’ probability of loan renegotiation by 14% relative to the mean. This effect is concentrated in mortgages with greater ambiguity surrounding the loan value maximizing action. Overall, our results support the notion that tranching worsens agency frictions by increasing coordination costs among investors and impeding their monitoring of the agent.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":51421,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The agency costs of tranching: Evidence from RMBS\",\"authors\":\"Sanket Korgaonkar\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101030\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>This paper documents the agency costs resulting from the deeper tranching of subprime residential mortgage pools. Mortgage servicers are less likely to renegotiate delinquent loans collateralizing a greater number and variety of tranches. We find that an interquartile increase in tranching reduces mortgage servicers’ probability of loan renegotiation by 14% relative to the mean. This effect is concentrated in mortgages with greater ambiguity surrounding the loan value maximizing action. Overall, our results support the notion that tranching worsens agency frictions by increasing coordination costs among investors and impeding their monitoring of the agent.</p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":51421,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Financial Intermediation\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Financial Intermediation\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S104295732300013X\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Financial Intermediation","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S104295732300013X","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper documents the agency costs resulting from the deeper tranching of subprime residential mortgage pools. Mortgage servicers are less likely to renegotiate delinquent loans collateralizing a greater number and variety of tranches. We find that an interquartile increase in tranching reduces mortgage servicers’ probability of loan renegotiation by 14% relative to the mean. This effect is concentrated in mortgages with greater ambiguity surrounding the loan value maximizing action. Overall, our results support the notion that tranching worsens agency frictions by increasing coordination costs among investors and impeding their monitoring of the agent.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of Financial Intermediation seeks to publish research in the broad areas of financial intermediation, financial market structure, corporate finance, risk management, and valuation.
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