法律的前沿:法律选择中的公共政策例外

IF 0.7 4区 社会学 Q2 LAW University of Toronto Law Journal Pub Date : 2022-04-12 DOI:10.3138/utlj-2021-0085
Joanna Langille
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引用次数: 1

摘要

公共政策例外是法律选择学说中臭名昭著的一部分。这一例外情况允许法院拒绝适用由违反法院地道德和正义基本原则的一级法律选择规则选择的外国法律。作为一个理论问题,公共政策是法律选择体系中一个公认的组成部分。但鉴于该领域的规范结构,学者们一直难以理解为什么它应该成为法律选择学说的一部分;如何区分为其使用提供信息的基本规范和非基本规范;以及如何连贯地理解主要的公共政策案例。在这篇文章中,我提出了这三个问题的解决方案。我认为,我们应该将例外重新定义为一种手段,法院可以通过这种手段分析外国法律的实质,以确保其符合法治,从而可以在法院地“作为法律”适用。更具体地说,公共政策是普通法法院如何确保其适用的任何外国法律符合普通法传统中法治的独特实质要求,即所谓的普通法宪法。因此,公共政策在普通法传统中界定了合法性的边界,并防范来自边界之外的法治威胁。考虑到该领域的其他规范性承诺,这种方法证明将例外情况纳入法律选择学说是合理的。它还可以帮助区分应该界定公共政策范围的基本规范和非基本规范。最后,这种方法可以对该学说进行连贯的解释,因为可以重新解释许多主要案例,以追踪普通法宪法中固有的合法性基本原则。
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Frontiers Of Legality: Understanding The Public Policy Exception In Choice Of Law
The public policy exception is a notorious part of choice of law doctrine. The exception allows courts to refuse to apply foreign law selected by first-order choice of law rules that violates the forum’s fundamental principles of morality and justice. As a doctrinal matter, public policy is a well-established part of the architecture of choice of law. But scholars have struggled to understand why it should be part of choice of law doctrine, given the normative structure of the field; how to differentiate between the fundamental and non-fundamental norms that inform its use; and how to understand the leading public policy cases in a coherent way. In this Article, I offer a solution to these three problems. I argue we should reconceptualize the exception as a means by which courts can analyze the substance of foreign law to ensure that it complies with the rule of law, and thus can be applied ‘as a law’ in the forum. More specifically, public policy is how common law courts ensure that any foreign law they apply complies with the distinctive substantive requirements of the rule of law in the common law tradition – what is known as the common law constitution. Public policy thus defines the frontiers of legality in the common law tradition, and defends against threats from the rule of law that come from beyond the border. This approach justifies the inclusion of the exception in choice of law doctrine, given the field’s other normative commitments. It can also help distinguish between the fundamental and non-fundamental norms that should define the ambit of public policy. Finally, this approach may offer a coherent account of the doctrine, as numerous leading cases can be reinterpreted to track the fundamental principles of legality that inhere in the common law constitution.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
16.70%
发文量
26
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