Ezri Chernak, Kurt Dietrich, Ashley Raspopovic, Sarah Turri, John Turri
{"title":"因疏忽而说谎:实验研究","authors":"Ezri Chernak, Kurt Dietrich, Ashley Raspopovic, Sarah Turri, John Turri","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2021.0014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Leading theories of lying disagree on many points, but they agree on the following assumption: lying essentially involves asserting. The possibility of lying by omission poses a challenge to that shared assumption. To lie by omission is to lie by not asserting. This paper is the first experimental investigation of whether lying by omission is conceptually possible, according to our ordinary, shared lying concept. Overall, our results support, without proving, that it is not possible. Based on the present findings, we hypothesize that to the extent that people are tempted to call an omission a “lie,” it is for lack of a better word. When provided more flexibility to express themselves, almost no one in our studies counted an omission as a lie. keywords: lying; assertion; communication; omission; signaling * This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science). Please cite the final, published version if possible. Data and materials available here: https://osf.io/a6ehs","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Lying by Omission: Experimental Studies\",\"authors\":\"Ezri Chernak, Kurt Dietrich, Ashley Raspopovic, Sarah Turri, John Turri\",\"doi\":\"10.14394/filnau.2021.0014\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Leading theories of lying disagree on many points, but they agree on the following assumption: lying essentially involves asserting. The possibility of lying by omission poses a challenge to that shared assumption. To lie by omission is to lie by not asserting. This paper is the first experimental investigation of whether lying by omission is conceptually possible, according to our ordinary, shared lying concept. Overall, our results support, without proving, that it is not possible. Based on the present findings, we hypothesize that to the extent that people are tempted to call an omission a “lie,” it is for lack of a better word. When provided more flexibility to express themselves, almost no one in our studies counted an omission as a lie. keywords: lying; assertion; communication; omission; signaling * This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science). Please cite the final, published version if possible. Data and materials available here: https://osf.io/a6ehs\",\"PeriodicalId\":41424,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Filozofia Nauki\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Filozofia Nauki\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0014\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Filozofia Nauki","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2021.0014","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
Leading theories of lying disagree on many points, but they agree on the following assumption: lying essentially involves asserting. The possibility of lying by omission poses a challenge to that shared assumption. To lie by omission is to lie by not asserting. This paper is the first experimental investigation of whether lying by omission is conceptually possible, according to our ordinary, shared lying concept. Overall, our results support, without proving, that it is not possible. Based on the present findings, we hypothesize that to the extent that people are tempted to call an omission a “lie,” it is for lack of a better word. When provided more flexibility to express themselves, almost no one in our studies counted an omission as a lie. keywords: lying; assertion; communication; omission; signaling * This is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science). Please cite the final, published version if possible. Data and materials available here: https://osf.io/a6ehs
期刊介绍:
Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science) is a double-blind peer-reviewed academic quarterly published by the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. It publishes articles, notes, and reviews covering the whole range of analytic philosophy, including among others: epistemology, ontology, general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences, experimental philosophy. We invite papers not only from professional philosophers but also from specialists in different areas, interested in generalizing their scientific experiences towards more foundational issues.