The Tragic Consumer: A Nietzschean Reading of Irremediably Unsatisfactory Consumption

Abstract This essay criticizes the romantic ethic of consumption (Campbell, 1987) from the tragic perspective (Nietzsche, 2006). By tragic, we refer to the constant tension between Apollo and Dionysius (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 47). It is suggested that the romantic ethic of consumption, which orders our existence, is associated with Apollonian ideals, thus, creating a protective and individuating illusion against the chaotic, the amorphous, and the contradictory—characteristics associated with the Dionysian. What has been considered as the romantic-Apollonian ethic of consumption promises to satiate our desires (Campbell, 2006), even though this is not possible since incompleteness is inherent to the individual (Freud, 1996, 1997). This ethic may prove frustrating for some consumers since the satiation of wills has a transient effect and the individual therefore remains in a state of desire. In cases like these, an alternative to the romantic meaning would be the adoption of a tragic conception of consumption, a conception consubstantiated in the knowledge of its uselessness as a strategy to recover a lost completeness. Thus, this article describes the figure of the tragic consumer, the one who knows the chaotic side of the act of consuming, but who reaffirms his or her will, either consuming—since he perceives that there is no escape from the logic imposed by consumption—or by choosing to abandon specific categories of goods that do not respond to the reiteration of his will. As a practical instance for the development of this critique, we have reflected on the phenomenon of category abandonment (Suarez & Chauvel, 2012).