Il ‘lodo Moro’: terrorismo e ragion di stato, 1969–1986 [The ‘lodo Moro’: terrorism and reason of state, 1969–1986]

Cold War Italy was a land of mysteries. There are still blind spots in our knowledge of the deadly bombings that were part of the right-wing ‘strategy of tension’ in the 1960s and 1970s. Commentators continue to debate aspects of the kidnapping and murder of Christian Democratic grandee Aldo Moro in 1978, and the reasons for the destruction of an Italian civil airliner with 81 people aboard near the island of Ustica in June 1980. Only recently have magistrates identified with some degree of certainty the mandanti – the behind-the-scenes sponsors – of the Bologna train station bombing that killed 85 in August 1980. In this absorbing multi-archival study, Valentine Lomellini seeks to resolve another persistent mystery in the history of Cold War Italy: as foreign minister in the 1970s, did Moro arrange a secret ‘lodo’ (a deal implying a pay-off of some kind) with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and/or other Palestinian nationalist groups, to spare Italy from attacks? As she points out, Moro was a member of the progressive wing of the Christian Democratic Party (DC) which saw Italy as a bridge between the West and the developing world and looked sympathetically on Palestinian nationalism. Lomellini places the Italian attitude towards the sharp escalation of attacks in the early 1970s – accompanied by (and connected to) internecine conflict within the Palestinian resistance – in the broader European context. She examines European states’ deals to allow terrorists to depart to Gaddafi’s Libya, or other Arab destinations, in return for the release of hostages. An important case in point was the Austrian government’s September 1973 deal with terrorists who had taken control of a train carrying Soviet Jewish emigrants. Lomellini begins her careful reconstruction of Italian events the same month, detailing an operation conducted by SID (Servizio informazioni difesa, Italian military intelligence) and Mossad that led to the arrest of five men (a Lebanese, an Algerian, a Syrian, an Iraqi, and a Libyan) planning to use Soviet-made missiles to shoot down an Israeli plane departing from Rome’s Fiumicino airport. When the Black September organisation threatened Italy with severe consequences if the five were not released, the Italian government secretly requested Libyan intercession, extending the deadline. In October, Italian diplomats in Cairo met with an official PLO representative who offered a deal whereby Italy would be spared from attacks if it allowed the PLO to take custody of the five and try them. Although the evidence provided by Lomellini is incomplete and circumstantial, it is at this point that Moro and his colleagues appear to have made a key decision: to rely on Libya rather than the PLO. Despite its suspicions of Libyan complicity with the five (one of whom was a Libyan national) and its efforts to promote the fortunes of the moderate elements of Al Fatah within the PLO, the Italian government recognised that the PLO was unable to control extremist groups like Black September and thus could not be counted on to honour an agreement. By the end of October, two of the five (including the Libyan) were released from custody and flown on a SID plane to Tripoli whilst the remaining three were tried and then later released in February 1974. The metaphorical ink on Italy’s understanding with Tripoli (the exact nature of which is unknown) was hardly dry on 17 December 1973 when two teams of Arab terrorists attacked a PanAm airliner on the tarmac at Fiumicino, killing 30 people. A Lufthansa liner with hostages aboard was flown to Damascus, then Kuwait, where the hostages were released, and the hijackers taken – temporarily – into custody. The attack was the handiwork of the Libya-