{"title":"Kreps & Scheinkman与产品差异化","authors":"Stephen Martin","doi":"10.3868/S060-008-019-0011-4","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)'s celebrated result is that in a two-stage model of a market with homogeneous products in which firms noncooperatively pick capacities in the first stage and set prices in the second stage, the equilibrium outcome is that of a one-shot Cournot game. This note derives capacity best response functions for the first stage and extends the Kreps and Scheinkman result to the case of differentiated products.","PeriodicalId":44830,"journal":{"name":"Frontiers of Economics in China","volume":"14 1","pages":"203-219"},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2019-07-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Kreps & Scheinkman with Product Differentiation\",\"authors\":\"Stephen Martin\",\"doi\":\"10.3868/S060-008-019-0011-4\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)'s celebrated result is that in a two-stage model of a market with homogeneous products in which firms noncooperatively pick capacities in the first stage and set prices in the second stage, the equilibrium outcome is that of a one-shot Cournot game. This note derives capacity best response functions for the first stage and extends the Kreps and Scheinkman result to the case of differentiated products.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44830,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Frontiers of Economics in China\",\"volume\":\"14 1\",\"pages\":\"203-219\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-07-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Frontiers of Economics in China\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.3868/S060-008-019-0011-4\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Frontiers of Economics in China","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.3868/S060-008-019-0011-4","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)'s celebrated result is that in a two-stage model of a market with homogeneous products in which firms noncooperatively pick capacities in the first stage and set prices in the second stage, the equilibrium outcome is that of a one-shot Cournot game. This note derives capacity best response functions for the first stage and extends the Kreps and Scheinkman result to the case of differentiated products.
期刊介绍：
Frontiers of Economics in China seeks to provide a forum for a broad blend of peer-reviewed academic papers of economics in order to promote communication and exchanges between economists in China and abroad. It will reflect the enormous advances that are currently being made in China in the field of economy and society. In addition, this journal also bears the mission of introducing the academic achievements on Chinese economics research to the world.
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