公司控制权市场中的代理成本:来自英国收购的证据

IF 3.6 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE Review of Accounting and Finance Pub Date : 2021-06-08 DOI:10.1108/RAF-04-2020-0083
E. Jones, Bing Xu, Konstantin Kamp
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引用次数: 1

摘要

目的:本文考察了代理成本是否能预测1986年至2015年间英国上市公司的纪律收购可能性。设计/方法/方法:使用生存分析,我们的方法是在托宾Q(TQ)的基础上确定学科接管的候选人,这与Manne(1965)倡导的方法一致。然后,我们研究了代理成本指标如何影响纪律候选人中的收购可能性。调查结果:我们提供了托宾Q(而非超额回报)在确定纪律接管候选人方面的有效性证据。资产利用率和销售额增长水平较高的公司,纪律候选人的收购风险更高。代理问题更严重的公司相对来说不太容易受到纪律接管的影响。实际意义:考虑到我们研究的英国背景,即反收购条款被禁止,并且与美国的研究结果相比,我们的研究结果暗示了对公开合并政策有效性的一些支持。独创性/价值:虽然先前的研究已经将收购可能性与公司控制权市场联系起来,但我们的研究采用了比先前的收购可能性研究更明确的代理理论框架。我们贡献的一个关键组成部分是将纪律接管的候选人与其他形式的并购区分开来。
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Agency costs in the market for corporate control: evidence from UK takeovers
Purpose: This paper examines whether agency costs predict disciplinary takeover likelihood for UK listed companies between 1986 and 2015. Design/Methodology/Approach: Using survival analysis, our approach is to identify candidates for disciplinary takeover on the basis of Tobin’s Q (TQ), which is consistent with the approach advocated by Manne (1965). We then examine how indicators of agency costs affect takeover likelihood within the set of disciplinary candidates. Findings: We provide evidence of the effectiveness of Tobin’s Q, rather than excess return, in identifying disciplinary takeover candidates. Takeover hazard for disciplinary candidates is higher for companies with higher levels of asset utilization and sales growth in particular. Companies with stronger agency problems are relatively less susceptible to disciplinary takeover. Practical Implications: Given the UK context of our study, where anti-takeover provisions are disallowed, and when compared to findings of US studies, our results imply some support for the effectiveness of an open merger policy. Originality/Value: While the connection between takeover likelihood and the market for corporate control has been made in previous studies, our study adopts a more explicit agency theory framework than previous studies of takeover likelihood. A key component of our contribution follows from differentiating candidates for disciplinary takeovers from other forms of M&A.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
18
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