{"title":"Neopopper反对功能主义的论点","authors":"M. Pawłowski","doi":"10.14394/filnau.2019.0018","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article presents a new argument against mind–body functionalism, strongly inspired by some remarks made by Karl Popper. First, the author presents the original Popperian argument against materialism (from The Self and Its Brain) and its reconstruction by Mariusz Grygianiec. The argument’s conclusion is that if materialism is true, it must also be devoid of any rational grounding. Employing Ned Block’s and Joseph Levine’s accounts of functionalism, the author reformulates the original objection in order to make it a threat to functionalism, which is a more widespread view than the identity theory (which was the aim of Popper’s criticism). The argument proves to be resilient to some potential dangers: Hilary Putnam’s example of the Twin Earth or a duplicate counter-argument mentioned by Block. The conclusion is analogous to the original one: functionalism, provided that it is true, is irrational.","PeriodicalId":41424,"journal":{"name":"Filozofia Nauki","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Neopopperowski argument przeciw funkcjonalizmowi\",\"authors\":\"M. Pawłowski\",\"doi\":\"10.14394/filnau.2019.0018\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article presents a new argument against mind–body functionalism, strongly inspired by some remarks made by Karl Popper. First, the author presents the original Popperian argument against materialism (from The Self and Its Brain) and its reconstruction by Mariusz Grygianiec. The argument’s conclusion is that if materialism is true, it must also be devoid of any rational grounding. Employing Ned Block’s and Joseph Levine’s accounts of functionalism, the author reformulates the original objection in order to make it a threat to functionalism, which is a more widespread view than the identity theory (which was the aim of Popper’s criticism). The argument proves to be resilient to some potential dangers: Hilary Putnam’s example of the Twin Earth or a duplicate counter-argument mentioned by Block. The conclusion is analogous to the original one: functionalism, provided that it is true, is irrational.\",\"PeriodicalId\":41424,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Filozofia Nauki\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-10-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Filozofia Nauki\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0018\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Filozofia Nauki","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2019.0018","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
This article presents a new argument against mind–body functionalism, strongly inspired by some remarks made by Karl Popper. First, the author presents the original Popperian argument against materialism (from The Self and Its Brain) and its reconstruction by Mariusz Grygianiec. The argument’s conclusion is that if materialism is true, it must also be devoid of any rational grounding. Employing Ned Block’s and Joseph Levine’s accounts of functionalism, the author reformulates the original objection in order to make it a threat to functionalism, which is a more widespread view than the identity theory (which was the aim of Popper’s criticism). The argument proves to be resilient to some potential dangers: Hilary Putnam’s example of the Twin Earth or a duplicate counter-argument mentioned by Block. The conclusion is analogous to the original one: functionalism, provided that it is true, is irrational.
期刊介绍:
Filozofia Nauki (The Philosophy of Science) is a double-blind peer-reviewed academic quarterly published by the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. It publishes articles, notes, and reviews covering the whole range of analytic philosophy, including among others: epistemology, ontology, general philosophy of science, philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology, philosophy of mathematics, philosophical logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of action, philosophy of mind, cognitive sciences, experimental philosophy. We invite papers not only from professional philosophers but also from specialists in different areas, interested in generalizing their scientific experiences towards more foundational issues.