价格歧视对有限理性动态双寡头博弈的影响

IF 0.7 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics Pub Date : 2020-12-18 DOI:10.1515/snde-2019-0137

Q. Song, Wei-li Zhang, Yi-Rong Jiang, Juan Geng

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在同质产品市场中，顾客需求弹性的不同可能导致价格的不同。本文通过假设每个企业收取K个价格并基于有限理性调整其策略，考察了价格歧视对古诺双寡头博弈中均衡点的影响。考虑到价格歧视，对具有同质或异质期望的参与者引入了两个具有2K变量的离散动态博弈系统。发现纳什均衡点的稳定性与价格歧视无关。在存在价格歧视的情况下，具有同质参与人的系统与具有异质参与人的系统的边界平稳点的稳定性是不同的。数值模拟验证了均匀参与人系统从稳定到分岔的临界点。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The effect of price discrimination on dynamic duopoly games with bounded rationality

Abstract In a homogenous product market, customers’ different demand elasticities may lead to different prices. This study examined price discrimination’s effect on equilibrium points in Cournot duopoly games by assuming that each firm charges K prices and adjusts its strategies based on bounded rationality. In consideration of price discrimination, two discrete dynamic game systems with 2K variables were introduced for players with homogenous or heterogenous expectations. The stability of the Nash equilibrium point was found to be independent of price discrimination. Given price discrimination, the stability of boundary stationary points for the system with homogenous players is different from that for the system with heterogenous players. Numerical simulations verified the critical point for the system with homogenous players from being stable to its bifurcation.

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来源期刊

Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics Multiple-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

12.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics (SNDE) recognizes that advances in statistics and dynamical systems theory may increase our understanding of economic and financial markets. The journal seeks both theoretical and applied papers that characterize and motivate nonlinear phenomena. Researchers are required to assist replication of empirical results by providing copies of data and programs online. Algorithms and rapid communications are also published.