CEO的专业知识与薪酬合同的设计：来自一般CEO与专家CEO的证据

IF 1.4 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2020-09-10 DOI:10.2308/JMAR-19-019

Chunbo Liu, Wei Shi, K. Wei

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引用次数: 3

摘要

通才型ceo的薪酬高于专才型ceo (Custódio et al. 2013)。然而，CEO专业知识对CEO薪酬的影响却鲜为人知。我们推测，由于信息不对称，多面手ceo可能会夸大他们与股东签订合同的能力。为了设计一个最优契约，多面手ceo的薪酬应该与公司业绩更紧密地联系在一起。我们的结果支持这一猜想。多面手ceo的薪酬绩效敏感性高于专门型ceo，尤其是当多面手ceo较年轻或刚入职不久，或者他们对公司绩效更重要时。JEL分类:G34;J24;J33

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CEO Expertise and the Design of Compensation Contracts: Evidence from Generalist versus Specialist CEOs

Generalist CEOs enjoy higher pay than specialist CEOs (Custódio et al. 2013). However, the implication of CEO expertise on how CEOs are paid is little known. We conjecture that due to information asymmetry, generalist CEOs may overstate their ability in contracting with shareholders. To design an optimal contract, the pay for generalist CEOs should be more closely linked to firm performance. Our results support this conjecture. The pay-performance sensitivity is higher for generalist than for specialist CEOs, especially when generalist CEOs are younger or in their early years of tenure or when they are more important to firm performance. JEL Classification: G34; J24; J33

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来源期刊

Journal of Management Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

2.90

自引率

5.90%

发文量

期刊介绍： The mission of the Journal of Management Accounting Research (JMAR) is to advance the theory and practice of management accounting through publication of high-quality applied and theoretical research, using any well-executed research method. JMAR serves the global community of scholars and practitioners whose work impacts or is informed by the role that accounting information plays in decision-making and performance measurement within organizations. Settings may include profit and not-for profit organizations, service, retail and manufacturing organizations and domestic, foreign, and multinational firms. JMAR furthermore seeks to advance an understanding of management accounting in its broader context, such as issues related to the interface between internal and external reporting or taxation. New theories, topical areas, and research methods, as well as original research with novel implications to improve practice and disseminate the best managerial accounting practices are encouraged.