消除银行利益冲突:沃尔克规则的意义

IF 1.2 1区 社会学 Q1 LAW Yale Journal on Regulation Pub Date : 2017-07-01 DOI:10.2139/SSRN.3017207
S. B. Avci, Cindy A. Schipani, H. Seyhun
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引用次数: 7

摘要

1999年,《格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案》的大部分条款逐渐削弱并随后被废除,这使得商业银行能够收购投资银行子公司,规模大幅增长,并通过更多样化的银行活动获得更多信息。与此同时,自营交易成为银行的主要收入来源。随后的2008年金融危机暴露了后格拉斯-斯蒂格尔时代银行业的另一个明显弱点。银行规模太大、风险太大、相互关联性太强,许多银行的资产负债表内外资产、银行间贷款和负债超过数万亿美元。仅银行业的规模、风险和相互联系就引发了人们对系统重要性和大到不能倒的银行的担忧。在多次试图恢复格拉斯-斯蒂格尔法案失败后,国会试图通过沃尔克规则禁止自营交易,并在《多德-弗兰克法案》中颁布消费者保护和其他围栏和防火墙条款,来遏制银行系统性银行风险。为了测试沃尔克规则的潜在重要性,我们需要知道银行通过使用客户的专有不利信息获得的利润。然而,银行用于执行其专有交易程序的专有信息的来源通常是保密的。此外,银行不披露他们在哪里以及如何获得这些机密信息,这有助于他们每年创造数十亿美元的利润。在本文中,我们调查了这些信息的一个可能来源。具体而言,我们调查了私人信息银行作为其金融中介和金融顾问角色的一部分对其客户公司的重要性。银行通常会获得内幕交易资格,并在受雇为其客户公司提供财务建议时受到内幕交易报告要求和交易限制。当银行成为临时内部人时,他们还必须与其他合法内部人一起报告在表格3、4和5中执行的所有这些交易。使用这个内幕交易数据库,我们证明银行可以而且确实可以访问有关其客户的重要、私人、重要信息,并利用这些信息进行交易。平均而言,银行获取和交易的内幕信息非常有价值,使银行能够在自营交易中获得25%的收益。此外,我们发现,格拉斯-斯蒂格尔限制的放松和取消使银行能够更频繁地进行交易,并获得更多的异常利润。自2002年以来,银行往往从客户公司的不利信息中交易并赚取超过40%的异常利润。因此,我们证明,执行沃尔克规则的另一个好处是,通过消除银行的自营交易,消除了利用客户的重大非公开信息进行交易的动机。因此,我们认为,执行沃尔克规则也有助于遏制由于取消格拉斯-斯蒂格尔限制而导致的银行系统中的一些当前利益冲突。
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Eliminating Conflicts of Interests in Banks: The Significance of the Volcker Rule
The gradual weakening and subsequent repeal of most provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 allowed commercial banks to acquire investment banking subsidiaries, to grow substantially in size, and to access even more information through more diverse banking activities. At the same time, proprietary trading became a major source of revenue for the banks. The subsequent financial crisis of 2008 exposed another glaring weakness of banking in the post-Glass-Steagall era. Banks had grown too big, too risky and too interconnected, many surpassing trillions of dollars in assets, interbank loans and liabilities on and off balance sheet. The sheer size, risk and interconnectedness of banking alone raised concerns about systemically important and too-big-to-fail banks. After numerous attempts to bring back Glass-Steagall failed, Congress attempted to contain banking systemic banking risk by passing the Volcker rule to prohibit proprietary trading, and enacting consumer protection and other ring-fencing and fire-wall provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act. To test the potential importance of the Volcker Rule, we would need to know the amount of profits banks make from using proprietary adverse information about their clients. However, the source of the proprietary information banks use to execute their proprietary trading programs is typically confidential. Furthermore, banks do not disclose where and how they obtain this confidential information, which helps them create billions of dollars of profits every year. In this paper we investigate one possible source of this information. Specifically, we investigate the importance of the private information banks acquire as part of their financial intermediary and financial advisory role for their client firms. Banks often attain insider trading status and become subject to insider trading reporting requirements and trading restrictions when they are hired to provide financial advice to their client firms. When banks become temporary insiders, they must also report all of these trades executed on Forms 3, 4, and 5 alongside other legal insiders. Using this insider trading database, we demonstrate that banks can and do access important, private, material information about their clients and trade on this information. On average, the inside information that banks acquire and trade on is highly valuable, allowing the banks to earn more on 25% on their proprietary trades. Furthermore, we find that relaxation and elimination of the Glass-Steagall restrictions allowed the banks to trade more frequently and earn greater amount of abnormal profits. Since 2002, banks tend to trade and earn more than 40% abnormal profits from adverse information about their client firms. Consequently, we demonstrate that an added benefit of enforcement of the Volcker Rule would be to eliminate the incentives to trade on material, non-public information about their clients by eliminating proprietary trading by banks. Thus, we argue that enforcing the Volcker Rule would also help contain some the current conflicts of interest in the banking system resulting from the elimination of Glass-Steagall restrictions.
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